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California has now joined almost all the other states in enacting legislation
that authorizes a new business entity-the limited liability company ( LLC)1 The
object of this new form is to obtain classification for federal income tax purposes
as a partnership, while at the same time allow the firm's owners to achieve
insulation from personal responsibility for the debts of the firm.2 The purpose of
this article is neither to praise nor criticize this overall development? I leave to
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.S. 1974, University of
California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1977, University of California, Berkeley.
1. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West Supp. 1996). Even more recently, California enacted a
limited liability partnership (or LLP) statute. See Julia A. Butcher, Review of Selected 1995 California
Legislation, 27 PAc. L.J. 349, 440-47 (1996) (discussing the enactment of S.B. 513, dealing with LLPs,
available at 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 679, sec. 1-20, at 4079-98). This statute provides limited liability to law
and accounting firms in exchange for minimum insurance coverage. Beyond this, California LLPs generally
are governed by the State's version of the Uniform Partnership Act. Hence, the LLP act raises few of the issues
addressed in this article which occur in the far broader LLC act.
2. See FRANKLIN A. GEvURTz, BUSINESS PLANNING 53-109 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing in detail why
this combination is desirable).
3. See, e.g., Timothy M. Harris, Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC. LJ. 202, 305,
309-11 (1995) (explaining the purpose and concerns underlying California's LLC enactment).
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others, as well, the task of providing an overview of the act.4 Instead, this article
will critique a select number of specific provisions of California's new LLC act.
Some I single out for kudos, in the hope that jurisdictions which lack such terms
in their LLC acts will be convinced to follow California's lead on these issues.
Other portions of California's act, however, raise points for our own legislature
to reconsider. These either reflect questionable policy or ambiguous drafting.
This article will address two broad areas. Part I considers various provisions
impacting the rights of LLC members with respect to each other. First, this will
entail an overview and critique of the rules governing members' financial and
management rights in the absence of contrary agreement. By and large these pro-
visions are unexceptional, and, accordingly, this overview will be brief. Next, this
part explores the provisions relevant to the always controversial subject of fidu-
ciary duty. Finally, this part will take an extended look at the coherence and
wisdom of the most complex provisions in the LLC act-those dealing with
fundamental changes.
Part II of this article looks at provisions in the LLC act which bear upon the
protection accorded to third parties dealing with the firm. The focus is narrower
here. This part will look at the rules limiting distributions from an LLC to its
members, as well as the provision applying corporate "piercing-the-veil" doctrine
to LLCs.
I. RIGHTS OF THE MEMBERS INTER SE
A. Basic Operating Rules
California's LLC act is generally similar to most states' with respect to the
rules governing members' relations to each other. As with other states,
California's LLC statute, by and large, allows the parties to make whatever agree-
ment they wish concerning management, contributions and sharing of profit and
loss.5 The act contains non-waivable provisions concerning certain aspects of
fundamental transactions. This includes the right of members to vote on a merger
or dissolution,6 the right of members to challenge expulsion clauses as unrea-
sonable,7 the right of a member obligated to provide services to withdraw, 8 and
a requirement that there be no less than a majority vote required to amend the
articles. 9 Also, members cannot waive rights to receive financial information and
4. See, e.g., RICHARD BURT ET AL., FORMING AND OPERATING CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES (1995) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA LLCs].
5. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17005 (West Supp. 1996).
6. Id. §§ 17005(b)(3), 17103(c) (West Supp. 1996).
7. Id. § 17005(b)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
8. Id. § 17005(b)(5) (West Supp. 1996).
9. Id. §§ 17005(b)(3), 17103(b) (West Supp. 1996).
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to inspect books and records.' ° These provisions are rather narrow and should
rarely interfere with parties structuring an LLC in the manner they desire.
Recognizing that parties may often overlook issues in forming a venture,
California's act, like all others, provides various "default" rules to govern in the
absence of agreement on matters likely to arise. Like most LLC acts, California's
calls for direct management by members, barring other agreement." It also joins
most states in calling for voting in proportion to profit interest, rather than per
capita, absent other agreement. 2 Direct management seems a reasonable default
rule for the sort of closely held business likely to operate as an LLC (as well as
more likely to neglect to cover the issue in a well drafted agreement).13 It is
difficult to say whether proportional or per capita voting is likely to be more
10. Id. § 17005(b)(4) (West Supp. 1996).
11. CAL CORP. CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-22(a) (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.110 (Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681 (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-401
(Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-401 (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-140 (West
Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1995);
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-304 (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-621 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para.
180/15-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-1(a) (West Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §
490A.702(1) (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (1996); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275,
§ 33 (Baldwin); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1311 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 651(1) (West
Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS'NS § 4A-402 (1993); MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.4401 (West
Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.079(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401(1) (1995);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2615 (Supp. 1994); NEv. REV. STAT. § 86.291 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-
C:31(U) (Supp. 1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-15(A)
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 401 (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-20(a)
(Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.130 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-14 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-34-16 (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022A (Michie 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.150 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-18(a) (Supp. 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 183.0401(1) (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116 (Supp. 1995). But see MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 322B.606 (West 1995) (requiring use of managers); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-69 (1995) (same);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2015 (West Supp. 1996) (providing for the use of managers unless otherwise
provided); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-238-101 (1995) (containing no default provision for member or
management control); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp. 1996) (providing for the
use of managers unless otherwise provided).
12. CAL CORP. CODE § 17103(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (1994); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-80-503 (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-142 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.701 (West
Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS'NS § 4A-403(1) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4502
(West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.356 (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.079(1) (Vernon Supp.
1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2615 (1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-17(A) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 402 (McKinney 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2020 (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-21 (1992); S.D. CODiFED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-16
(Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022B (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.120 (West Supp.
1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-18(b) (Supp. 1995); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0404(1)(a) (West Supp. 1995);
WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116 (Supp. 1995). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (1995) (per capita); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12:1318(A) (West 1994) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 653 (West Supp. 1995) (same);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:24 (Supp. 1995) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.150(2) (1995) (same); TEEN.
CODE ANN. § 48-224-101 (1995) (same).
13. Direct management is the default rule for partnerships. U.P.A. § 18(e) (1914).
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consistent with the participants' expectations; 4 hence, California's choice of
proportional voting is not unreasonable. On the other hand, changing this voting
rule in California requires a written agreement,' 5 which seems unnecessarily
restrictive for a closely held business.
16
As is generally true in LLC acts, participants in a California LLC may agree
to governance by managers, rather than directly by members. 7 As in many other
states, this requires a provision in the articles of organization, rather than just the
operating agreement.18 Since the effect of providing for managers in the articles
14. Compare Larry Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from
LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369,419-20 (1995) (arguing for a per capita default rule) with GEVUR'z, supra note
2, at 197 (questioning whether this is realistic for a firm with unequal contributions).
15. CAL. COp. CODE § 17103(a) (West Supp. 1996).
16. See Dennis Kaijala, Planning Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 455,
461-63 (1995).
17. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17151(a) (West Supp. 1996); cf ALA. CODE § 10-12-22(b) (1994); ALASKA
STAT. § 10.50.110(b) (Supp. 1995); ARIz, REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(b) (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
32-401 (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-401 (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-140(b)
(West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp.
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-204 (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-621(2) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. clh. 805,
para. 180/15-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-1(b) (West Supp. 1994), IOWA CODE
ANN. § 490A.705 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (1995); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch,
275, § 33 (Baldwin); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1312 (West 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 651(3)
(West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-402(a)(l) (1993); MICH. COmP. LAWS ANN. §
450.4402 (West Supp. 1995); MO. ANN. STAT. § 347.079(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-
402(2) (1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2615 (Supp. 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. § 86.291 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT,
ANN. § 304-C:31(I) (1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-15(B)
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 408 (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-24 (Supp.
1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.135 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-15 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-
16 (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024 (Michie 1993); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.150(2) (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-20 (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 183.0401(2) (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116 (Supp. 1995).
18. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17151(b) (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-10(8) (1994); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 10.50.075(5), 10.50.110 (Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-632(5)(a) (Supp. 1995); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-32-202(d) (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-204(1)(d) (Supp. 1995); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-121 (West Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.407(g)(1) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-11-204(b)(1) (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-608(4) (1994); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 18015-
5(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-2-4(b)(4) (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-
7607(7)(A), 17-7612 (1995); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 5(l)(e) (Baldwin); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1305(C)(2) (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 622(1)(C) (West Supp. 1995); MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. § 450A203(1)(d) (West Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.015(10), 347.039(l)(4)
(Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-102(14), 35-8-202(l)(d) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2606(i) (Supp. 1994); NEV. REv. STAT. § 86.161(2) (1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:12(II)(e) (1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-8(D) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LtAB. Co. LAW § 401(a) (MeKinney 1996);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-03(13), 57C-2-21(a)(5) (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.047(1)(d) (1995); 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8913(5) (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-6(a)(7) (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-
202(A)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFmED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-12(9) (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-205-101(5) (1995); Tx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 3.02(A)(5) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 48-2b-116(I)(f) (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.070(1)(e) (West Supp. 1996); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 183.0202(4) (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-117 (1989).
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is to cut off the apparent authority of members to bind the firm, '9the requirement
for such a provision to be in a public document is understandable. California's act
provides default rules which answer some,2° but by no means all,21 of the
questions which can arise in a manager governed LLC. Still, if parties are going
to depart from the primary default rule of member management, it is not too much
to ask that they then draft the details of their own agreement.
California's LLC act, like most others, allows contributions of any nature.'
In what appears to be something of an overkill, it goes into great detail to
authorize a wide variety of contractually established sanctions for failure to make
an agreed contribution?3 Like the majority of states, California's LLC act follows
the limited partnership default rule24 of profit sharing in proportion to contri-
butions, rather than the partnership law approach of equal sharing. 6 This creates
19. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17157(a), (b) (West Supp. 1996).
20. See iU § 17152(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1996) (dealing with election, removal, resignation, and term of
managers); iU § 17156 (West Supp. 1996) (addressing the required majority vote for LLCs with more than one
manager).
21. For example, the statute does not specify the frequency of required elections.
22. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17200(a) (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-26 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.275 (Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601(2), 29-701 (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
32-501 (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-102(4), 7-80-501 (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 34-150 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101(3), 18-501 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
608.421 1(1) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-401 (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-626 (1994);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, par. 180/20-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-1-5 (West 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.102(3), 490A.801(1) (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7602(i) (1995);
1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 39 (Baldwin); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301(3), 12:1321 (West
1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 661 (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-501
(1993); MICH. CONP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4301(1) (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN § 322B.40(2)(1) (West
1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.015(5) (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-501 (1995); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2614 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.321 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C: 1(III), 304-C:36(I)
(1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-2 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-20 (Michie Supp. 1995);
N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW §§ 102(0, 501 (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-4-01 (Supp. 1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE §10-32-56(2) (1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01(B), 1705.09(A) (Anderson Supp. 1994);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2001(4), 2023 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.175 (1995); 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8931(a) (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-2(e), 7-16-24, (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-501
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-19 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-232-
101(a) (1995); TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 5.01(A) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-
2b-124 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1002, 13.1-1027(A) (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
25.15.190 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1A-1(4), 31-1A-23(a) (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
183.0501(1) (West Supp. 1996); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-115 (1989).
23. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17201(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
24. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 503 (1985) [hereinafter U.L.P.A.].
25. U.P.A. § 18(a) (1914).
26. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17202 (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-28 (1994); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 7-80-503 (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-152 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
503 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4261 (West Supp. 1996); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/20-10 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-5-3 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.802 (West Supp.
1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS'NS § 4A-505(1) (1993); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 450A303 (Vest
Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.326 (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.111 (Vernon Supp. 1996);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:38 (1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-34 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-22 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 503 (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT.
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the potential for controversy as to whether services, for example, are an agreed
contribution, and, if so, the value of their worth.27 Fortunately, it is extremely rare
that the participants in a business venture will not make an explicit agreement
about profit sharing (if nothing else) and so must rely upon a default rule for this
subject.
On the other hand, overlooking the prospect of losses is a likely occurrence.
Here, a proportional to contribution rule, rather than an equal sharing rule, makes
sense--especially in a limited liability entity. The problem with equal loss sharing
in the face of unequal contributions is that the loss sharing agreement can require
the member(s) who made less contribution(s) to reimburse the member(s) who
made more.28 This creates a contradiction between the loss sharing arrangement
and the notion of liability limited to the agreed contribution.
One of the most contentious situations in closely held businesses operated as
a corporation occurs when the active participants attempt what is often referred
to as a squeeze-out of the inactive minority.29 Essentially, the active majority uses
its power to obtain pretty much all of the economic benefit from the business
through salaries and the like, while depriving the inactive minority of much of
any return by declaring few or no dividends.0 While California's LLC statute
contains a default rule for allocating distributions once made,31 it provides no
guidelines in the absence of agreement for when the LLC must make pre-with-
drawal distributions.3 2 This gap, however, is common to LLC acts,3 3 reflecting
perhaps its inevitability. Given the numerous variables involved in deciding
whether to distribute or reinvest a firm's earnings, it seems virtually impossible
to construct a reasonable statutory formula for when and how much of earnings
§ 57C-4-03 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-36 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705.10 (Anderson
Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2025(1) (West Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-26 (1992); TEX.
Rnv. Civ. STAT. Ann. art. 1528n, art. 5.02-1(A) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-130 (1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1029 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REy. CODE ANN. § 25.15.200 (West Supp. 1996);
W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-24 (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0503 (West Supp. 1995). But see ALASKA
STAT. § 10.50.290 (Supp. 1995); AMz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-709 (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-503
(Michie Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-403 (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-628 (1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7615(b), (c) (1995); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 41 (Baldwin); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:1323 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 663 (West Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-503
(1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.185(2) (1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8932 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-43-
503 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); TENN. CODEANN. § 48-220-101 (1995).
27. See, e.g., Advanced Orthopedics, L.L.C. v. Moon, 656 So. 2d 1103, 1106 (La. 1995) (rejecting the
claim by a former LLC-member for reimbursement for contributed services).
28. E.g., Richert v. Handly, 330 P.2d 1079 (Wash. 1958).
29. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-outs and Freeze-outs in Limited Liability Companies, 73
WASH. U.L.Q. 497,498-501 (1995).
30. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
31. CAL CORP. CODE § 17250 (West Supp. 1996).
32. See id, § 17251 (West Supp. 1996) (indicating that pre-withdrawal distributions occur at the times
or upon the events specified in the operating agreement).
33. GEVURaz, supra note 2, at 508-09.
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every firm should pay out. Accordingly, the prevention of squeeze-outs in LLCs
must come from provisions other than that governing distributions.
In this regard, California's statute contains an important rule which other
states would do well to follow. California's act, apparently alone among the
states, contains a provision preventing the payment of salaries to LLC members
without the agreement of all members (with a narrow exception for winding up
the business following dissolution).34 By depriving a majority of the ability to
obtain salaries without agreement, the California LLC act deters squeeze-outs in
which the majority is content to cut-off distributions to all, while voting salaries
to itself.
In rebuttal, one might ask whether California's rule does not give the passive
owners too much power to veto salaries justified by the circumstances. If parties
at the venture's inception contemplate unequal roles-some active, some
passive-presumably they will take this into account, either through their profit
shares or by agreeing to salaries at the start. The typical squeeze-out occurs after
some ownership interests, which started as active, become passive-perhaps
involuntarily at the behest of the majority (whether or not justified), or often
because of changing life circumstances (retirement, inheritance of shares by those
unable or unwilling to participate, or the like).33 These cases, unless anticipated
at the outset, seem to call for a renegotiation among the parties. The problem with
the corporate law approach-which allows salaries without consent of al136-is
that it enables the active majority to dictate terms without such renegotiation.
Such power seems excessive given the leverage parties providing needed services
already have.
B. Fiduciary Duty
Few undertakings in the area of business associations law seem to generate
quite as much controversy as does attempting to codify rules of fiduciary duty.
37
It is therefore not surprising that the drafters of California's LLC act, having
decided to address the subject, seem to have left the job unfinished. The center-
piece of their effort is section 17153 of the California Corporations Code.
34. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17004(b) (West Supp. 1996). This is also the rule for partnerships under the
Uniform Partnership Act. U.P.A. § 18(f) (1914). It is also part of the proposed Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act. UNiP. LTD. LtAB. Co. AcT § 403(d) (1995).
35. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
§ 2.03 (2d ed. 1985).
36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 141(h) (1991).
37. Witness the controversies surrounding the efforts to draft a duty of care provision for the Model
Business Corporation Act, to create corporate loyalty and care rules in the American Law Institute's Principles
of Corporate Governance and to draft rules of partnership fiduciary duty in the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act.
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Section 17153 states that managers of an LLC have the same fiduciary
obligation toward the firm and its members as a partner has toward his or her
partnership and partners.3 One problem with this approach is that the question of
what fiduciary duty a partner owes is not free from doubt. Once one gets past the
"punctilio of an honor the most sensitive,' '" 9 and the duty under section 21 of the
Uniform Partnership Act to "account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold
as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or
liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property,'"40 there are
plenty of questions: Does a partner owe the firm or his or her fellow partners any
duty of care? Or, put another way, must he or she pay the firm for losses resulting
from his or her negligence? 4t At the outset of the relationship, does a prospective
partner have any duty to disclose all facts which other prospective partners would
find important? 2 At the termination of the relationship, are there any limits on
dissolving an at-will partnership?4 3 Despite such questions, the decision to
incorporate partnership fiduciary duty brings to bear a substantial body of
authority which addresses many issues," even if not all. Moreover, it is probably
too much to expect that one state's LLC act should answer all the questions about
fiduciary duty which have avoided definitive answer in other business forms with
more history.
Another concern about section 17153 is whether it makes the correct choice
in looking to partnership law as the source of fiduciary duty for LLC managers.
Generally, the decision to incorporate partnership, rather than corporate, law rules
of fiduciary duty seems sensible. LLCs are likely to be closely held,45 have
substantial member participation in management, 46 and have limited markets for
38. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17153 (West Supp. 1996).
39. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
40. U.P.A. § 21 (1914).
41. Compare Ferguson v. Williams, 670 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) (declaring that partners
cannot be liable to fellow partners for negligent operation of the partnership) with REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHtP
ACT § 404(c) (1985) [hereinafter R.U.P.A.] (imposing liability for gross negligence).
42. Compare Herring v. Offutt, 295 A.2d 876 (Md. 1972) (finding such a duty to disclose) with
R.U.P.A. § 404(b)(1) (1985) (eliminating the portion of U.P.A. Section 21 relied upon in Herring).
43. Compare Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192,359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961) (stating in dicta that
there are limits in such a dissolution) with Johnson v. Kennedy, 214 N.E.2d 276 (Mass. 1966) (finding no such
limits).
44. See, e.g., Shulkin v. Schulkin, 16 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Mass. 1938) (barring contrary agreement one
cannot compete the with partnership); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546-47 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing the
duty to disclose opportunity); Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d 233, 238 (Wash. 1974) (concluding
that a partner had a duty to turn over to the partnership all profits made in a transaction between the partnership
and a partner without the consent of the other partners).
45. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
46. See CAL.. CORP. CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 1996) (barring a contrary provision in the articles,
members manage the LLC).
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their membership interests.47 Under these circumstances, some courts have held
that partnership fiduciary duty is appropriate even for shareholders in a closely
held corporation. 4 Hence, if the question was what fiduciary duty should mem-
bers in an LLC have, the answer of partnership law would seem obvious. Yet, this
is not what section 17153 directly addresses. Rather, it considers the fiduciary
duty of managers, who may not even be members. 49 Accordingly, perhaps
corporate law fiduciary duty rules-which contemplate delegated management-
might be more appropriate. Such distinctions, however, may be somewhat akin
to an effort to count angels on the head of a pin. For many purposes, the
difference between the fiduciary duties of partners and corporate managers may
be more apparent than real . Moreover, courts have made distinctions between
the fiduciary duty of managing and non-managing partners,5' which section
17153 could import. Nevertheless, for some issues, the distinction may be
important. For example, while some writers suggest partners owe each other no
duty of care,52 such a duty seems appropriate for managers. 3
The final concern with section 17153 is what it does not cover: the fiduciary
duty of members. Fortunately, section 17150 provides that if there is direct
management by members, then the members have the same obligations (pre-
sumably including section 17153's fiduciary duty) as managers. Members,
however, may retain substantial power in an LLC run by managers. For example,
they might vote on mergers, 54 sales of assets,55 expulsions,56 dissolutions, 57 or a
wide variety of other actions. Without any fiduciary duty, such transactions can
certainly be subject to abuse 8 Yet, the negative implication of specifying a
47. The desire to obtain partnership tax treatment often requires transfer restrictions. E.g., Rev. Proc.
95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20. Moreover, becoming publicly traded will lead to taxation as an association rather than
a partnership. I.R.C. § 7704 (1988).
48. E.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (Mass. 1975).
49. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17151(a) (West Supp. 1996).
50. See, e.g., Starrv. Fordham, 648 N.E.2d 1261, 1265-66 (Mass. 1995) (applying a fairness test, rather
than the business judgment rule, to a partner's conflict of interest transaction); Wyler v. Feuer, 85 Cal. App.
3d 392, 402, 149 Cal. Rptr. 626, 633 (1978) (applying business judgment rule to mismanagement claim against
the general partner in a limited partnership); Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 196, 359 P.2d 41, 44, 10 Cal. Rptr.
643, 646 (1961) (citing a corporate dissolution case in support of the proposition that partners cannot dissolve
in bad faith).
51. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,548 (N.Y. 1928).
52. E.g., Larry Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act,
46 Bus. LAW. 111, 140 (1990).
53. Perhaps a group of co-owners who are all active in management-and who could all, therefore,
harm the business through negligence-might be expected to agree (if they thought about the subject in
advance) to simply share such losses as part of the costs of the business. Delegated management to only some
participants suggests, however, a different expectation.
54. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1755 1(a) (West Supp. 1996).
55. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
57. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17350(c), (d) (West Supp. 1996).
58. See infra notes 127-33, 144-61, and 216-22 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary duty for managers, but not members, could form the basis for an
argument that members have no duty. Section 17613(b) and (c) is helpful here.
It imposes upon persons who control both sides in an LLC merger or other
"reorganization" the burden of proving the transaction is just and reasonable. 59
Still, this leaves gaps for expulsions, dissolutions and other transactions which do
not constitute a reorganization.6°
Two other provisions in the California act bear upon fiduciary duty. Section
17004 states that a member may transact business with the LLC.6 Does this
abrogate the partnership law fiduciary duty rule requiring full disclosure and
consent for such a transaction to be valid? 62 Section 17005(d) states that
modifying the fiduciary duty of a manager requires a provision in a written
operating agreement with the informed consent of the members.63 Is there any
limit on how far members can go in modifying a manager's fiduciary duty; for
example, can they agree to abrogate such a duty entirely?6
These questions suggest that the drafters of California's LLC act have a way
to go before they succeed in producing a completely coherent set of provisions
dealing with fiduciary duty in an LLC. An alternate approach, given the fact that
fiduciary duty historically has been an evolving judicial creation, would have
been to leave the whole question alone. In the end, one suspects courts will do
what they want in this area anyway.65
C. Fundamental Changes
One of the most complex areas in drafting legislation for a new business
entity involves transactions that change ownership or owner rights. This includes
the sale or combination of businesses, the entry of new owners, the involuntary
and voluntary exit of owners, and altering the contract between the owners. In
handling these subjects, the legislative drafter confronts very different models in
partnership versus corporate law-the former built around unanimous consent,
the latter around majority rule. LLC legislation, including California's statute,
often attempts to split the difference-some actions require unanimity, while
others simply a majority. One difficulty with this approach is that rules governing
59. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17613(b), (c) (West Supp. 1996).
60. See id. § 17600(a), (b) (West Supp. 1996) (defining "reorganization").
61. Id. § 17004 (West Supp. 1996).
62. See, e.g., Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Ky. 1982) (explaining the duty for partnerhsip
transactions).
63. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17005(d) (West Supp. 1996).
64. The question of whether, or to what extent, fiduciary duties should be subject to agreement has been
subject to considerable debate. E.g., Symposium on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1395 (1989). Resolution of this debate, however, is well beyond the scope of this article.
65. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405,417-24,241 P.2d
66, 73-77 (1952) (imposing a fairness review despite the language of the corporate directors conflict of interest
statute).
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these transactions often generate strategic responses, in other words, the use of
alternative statutory techniques to accomplish the same end, but with less
restrictive (or less protective, depending upon one's viewpoint) requirements.
Avoiding such strategic behavior requires shifting the focus of analysis from one
that views statutory procedures (e.g., merger and amendment of the operating
agreement) largely in isolation to an approach that examines the various ways to
achieve transactional objectives (e.g., sale or combination of businesses and
involuntary removal of owners). This is what the following discussion seeks to
do.
1. Sale or Combination of Businesses
Owners of partnerships and corporations possess a number of alternate routes
for structuring a sale or combination of businesses.6 In either form of business,
parties may structure the transaction as a sale by one entity of all its assets to
another entity (presumably followed by dissolution of the selling firm) or a sale
by the owners of one entity of their ownership interests. With corporations, a third
choice-the statutory merger of two corporate entities into one surviving firm-is
also available.67
Barring other agreement, sale of substantially all the assets of a partnership
generally requires unanimous approval of the selling firm's partnersH and, if the
buyer is a partnership, unanimity of the buyer's partners.69 While, absent other
agreement, partners may assign their interests in the firm, 0 the assignee cannot
become a new partner with management rights without the consent of all the other
partners.71 Hence, a sale or combination through the transfer of partnership
interests would also require unanimous approval. There is one technique to force
the sale of a partnership's business over objections. This is to dissolve the firm
and demand liquidation.7 2 Still, this does not force a particular sale. Rather, it
initiates an auction in which the objectors may end up buying the business.!3
Moreover, while this approach can force a cash sale, it cannot force a sale for
equity interests in a combined firm.74
66. See, e.g., GEVURTz, supra note 2, at 305,902-917.
67. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1100 (West 1990); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1991). The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act contains provisions allowing partnership mergers. R.U.P.A. §§ 905-908 (1994).
68. See U.P.A. § 18(h) (1986).
69. This depends upon whether the purchase of another firm's assets would be an action outside the
ordinary course of the buying partnership's business. Id.
70. See id. § 27(1) (1986).
71. Id. §§ 18(g), 27(1).
72. See id. §§ 31(1)(b), 38(1) (1986).
73. See, e.g., Prentiss v. Sheffel, 513 P.2d 949 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
74. See U.P.A. § 38(1) (1986) (listing the right to demand one's share "in cash").
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In contrast, corporate law follows a majority rule approach.7 5 Even so, the
votes required and other rights of the owners may be very different depending
upon how the parties structure the transaction.76 For example, the board of
directors of both the buying and selling corporations must approve either a
merger 77 or a sale of assetS, 78 whereas the board of a target corporation often may
oppose a sale by its stockholders of their stock-as in a hostile tender offer.79
Both corporations' shareholders typically must approve a merger,80 but the
nominally buying corporation's shareholders often have no vote on its purchase
of assets or stock.1 Corporate statutes commonly give shareholders dissenting
from a merger the right to demand that the company cash them out at a price set
by an appraisal.82 These rights may not be available in sales or combinations
carried out through asset or stock sales.83 As might be expected, these differences
have produced considerable litigation in which dissenters have asked courts to re-
characterize asset or stock sales as a "de facto" merger.!4 California's corpor-
ations statute seeks to avoid this problem through provisions that create a large
degree of voting and appraisal rights parity between different types of
"reorganizations," including mergers, asset sales and stock sales.
85
California's LLC act, like those in most other states, contains provisions
allowing for LLC mergers.86 A California LLC may merge with either another
75. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (1991) (instructing that a majority vote is necessary to
approve the sale of substantially all assets); id. § 251(c) (1991) (providing that a majority vote is required to
approve merger).
76. The structure of the transaction can also create numerous other legal impacts, affecting, for example,
tax, securities laws, and succession to assets and liabilities. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 2, at 918-1029.
77. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 251(b) (1991).
78. E.g., id. § 271 (1991).
79. E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
80. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1991).
81. E.g., GEvURqTz, supra note 2, at 907, 909.
82. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1991).
83. E.g., Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. Ch. 1963).
84. E.g., id.; Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146 (N.J. Super. 1960), aff'd, 161
A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960).
85. CAL. CORP.CODE§§ 181, 1200,1201,1300 (West 1990).
86. Id. § 17550 (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-54 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.500
(Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-752 (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1201 (Michie Supp.
1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-1003 (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-193 (West Supp. 1995);
DEL. CODE ANN. tiL 6, §§ 6, 18-209 (Supp. 1994); GA. CODEANN. § 14-11-901 (Michie Supp. 1995): IDAHO
CODE § 53-661 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-7-1 (West 1994); IOWA CODEANN. § 490A.1201 (West Supp.
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7650 (1995); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 69(1) (Baldwin); LA,
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:1357 (West Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 741(1) (West Supp. 1995);
MD.CoDE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S § 4A-701 (1993); MICH. COmp. LAWs ANN. § 450.4701 (West Supp. 1995);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.70(1) (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.127 (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-8-1201 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:18 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-20 (West Supp.
1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-59 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 1001 (MeKinney 1996);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-9-01 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-100 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 2054 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.481 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 7-16-59 (1992); S.D. CODIFED
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domestic or with a foreign LLC, or even with another business entity, such as a
corporation. 87 The general rule in the absence of a greater vote requirement in the
articles of organization or operating agreement is that members holding a
majority interest of each LLC may approve the merger.8 8 Exceptions to the
majority rule approach exist if members will have any personal liability as a result
of the merger,89 or if the merger affects any amendment to the operating agree-
ment of a merging LLC.90 As discussed later, this second exception could largely
eclipse the general rule.9 '
California's decision to allow sales or combinations of LLCs based upon
majority vote through mergers raises a couple of questions. To begin with, to
what extent has California's act avoided strategic behavior? With respect to
appraisal rights, California's LLC act borrows from the state's corporations
statute. It grants appraisal rights in a "reorganization"-defined to include
mergers, certain sales of assets and certain sales of membership interests.92 One
difference in this portion of the LLC act from its corporate counterpart is in the
concept of control, which is important in covering triangular transactions and
acquisitions of membership interests. 93 Instead of the California corporate law's
numerical test (ownership of stock with more than fifty percent of the voting
power),94 there is a situation-specific one-the power to direct the management
or policies of the business.95 This facts-and-circumstances approach creates
uncertainties avoided by numerical tests, which could make planning difficult for
these transactions. Still, given the variations available for governing an LLC,96 it
is probably impossible to set out a sensible numerical definition of control.
Moreover, it does not seem unreasonable to ask parties who wish to avoid any
doubt to provide appraisal rights.
LAWS ANN. § 47-34-38 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-244-101 (Supp. 1995); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, art. 10.01 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-149 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
1070 (Michie Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.15.115(2)(a) (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-
IA-41 (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.1201 (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-139 (Supp. 1994).
87. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17550 (West Supp. 1996).
88. Id. § 17551(a) (West Supp. 1996). Interestingly enough, the statute requires no vote of managers
in LLCs that choose governance by managers, in contrast to the gatekeeping role played by directors in a
corporate merger.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 1755 1(e) (West Supp. 1996).
91. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
92. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17600, 17601 (West Supp. 1996).
93. Specifically, the definition of a reorganization in section 17600 covers situations in which the
consideration for the purchase of assets or interests is an interest either in the acquiring firm or in another firm
that controls the acquiring firm (a triangular transaction). Also, this definition only picks up acquisitions of
interests if immediately after the acquisition the buyer will be in control of the target firm. Id. § 17600 (West
Supp. 1996).
94. Id. § 160(b), 181 (West 1990).
95. Id. § 17600 (West Supp. 1996).
96. As explained earlier, parties might govern their LLC by members or managers. They might vote
proportionate to profits or per capita. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
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Beyond the requirement that the transaction constitute a "reorganization,"
appraisal rights are only available to LLC members entitled to vote on the
transaction. 97 In addition, the questions of who votes and what vote is needed for
approval of an LLC sale or combination are obviously critical in their own right.
Here, in contrast to the care shown in attempting to reach all types of
"reorganizations" for purposes of appraisal rights generally, California's LLC act
contains gaps.
To begin with, what vote is required for an LLC to sell substantially all of its
assets? In the absence of any more specific guidance in the act, presumably
Section 17103(a)(3) governs. Since this provides for decision by members
holding a majority interest,9 the result comes out the same as the merger statute
and so generally achieves appropriate parity. One problem, however, arises if an
LLC chooses governance by managers, but the articles of organization or
operating agreement neglect to address the sale of substantially all of the assets.
If this happened with respect to mergers, the statutory requirement of at least a
majority vote of the members would control. The failure of the LLC act to
similarly address a sale of substantially all assets creates the question of whether
managers might undertake such a transaction without member approval.
In order to purchase control of an LLC through the acquisition of members'
interests, the LLC must admit the buyer as a new member.99 Also, purchasing
assets or equity interests in exchange for membership interests in an LLC entails
the entry of new members into the buying LLC. Parity with the merger provision
might suggest these transactions should, absent contrary agreement, take place
upon a majority vote. Yet, it takes (barring agreement otherwise) unanimous
consent to admit new members into a California LLC. to° Given the clear
legislative intent to allow mergers based upon a majority vote (unless otherwise
agreed), the lack of this other route for sales or combinations may be of little
practical concern. Moreover, the requirement of unanimity might be justified for
an acquisition by the purchase of members' interests, since this structure
otherwise would allow for creeping acquisitions. Such creeping acquisitions can
prejudice those selling out last.'"' One problem here, however, is that section
17301(a)(4) gives the selling member, absent other agreement, the right to
continue voting his or her former interest.'02 As a result, a buyer of a majority of
interests might take indirect control by contractually directing the votes of the
97. CAL CORP. CODE § 17601(a) (West Supp. 1996).
98. Id. § 17103(a) (West Supp. 1996).
99. See id. § 17301(a)(3), (4) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that an assignee who is not admitted as a
member does not have voting rights).
100. Id. § 17303(a) (West Supp. 1996).
101. See, e.g., Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 257, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781,784 (1969) (discussing
the case where, after purchasing control of a corporation, the buyer acquired the minority interests more
cheaply by threatening to cut off dividends).
102. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17301(a)(4) (West Supp. 1996).
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selling members-at least to the point of pushing through a merger or sale of
assets. This suggests that section 17301(a)(4) is a poor idea; members who sell
out do not still need to vote. 03
Beyond the problem of avoiding strategic responses, the second issue raised
by California's decision to allow LLC mergers upon majority vote is whether this
represents a sound legislative choice for parties who have not made their own
express choice. Put differently, would most such parties, if they initially con-
sidered the issue themselves, have agreed to this corporate law approach or would
they have preferred to follow the partnership model requiring unanimity? One
way to answer this question empirically would be to survey partnership agree-
ments and corporate articles and shareholders' agreements to see how many
attempt to alter the respective statutory norms. Practicality, though, suggests
another approach. One could examine the circumstances in which the partnership
and corporate law norms arose.
Historically, partnership rules arose in the context of closely held
businesses.'04 In that context, unanimous consent to combine or sell the business
makes some sense. After all, as stated above, the minority cannot block any sale,
since, barring other agreement, the majority could force a sale by dissolving the
partnership. In this event, however, those opposed to a sale may attempt to
acquire the business for themselves by being the high bidder in the liquidation-
which seems a fair way to resolve the disagreement. Corporate law rules, by
comparison, historically reflect the needs of a widely held business with passive
owners.'05 With large numbers of owners, unanimity becomes impractical.
Passive, scattered ownership suggests that minority shareholders would rarely be
in a position to attempt to acquire the business for themselves in a liquidation
sale. Since LLCs (particularly those not having their own comprehensive
agreement) are likely to be more closely than widely held, perhaps the partnership
unanimity norm would have been better.'06
2. Admission of New Members
Under the Uniform Partnership Act, admission of a new partner requires-
barring other agreement-unanimous approval of the existing partners.'0 7 By
contrast, the board of directors or even individual shareholders of a corporation
103. Cf. U.L.P.A. § 702 (1985) (stating that unless something to the contrary is provided for in the
partnership agreement, a partner in a limited partnership withdraws if he or she sells all of his or her interest).
104. CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATONS: CASES & MATERALS 58-59 (1992).
105. Id. at 152-53.
106. Under California's LLC act, the majority has the power to dissolve, barring contrary agreement.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17350(c) (West Supp. 1996). Hence, the partnership solution would be available in case
of a dispute regarding whether to sell.
107. U.P.A. § 18(g) (1986).
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generally can bring new shareholders into the company. Specifically, absent
restriction in the articles or in a valid shareholders agreement,'03 and subject to the
existence of unissued authorized shares,'0 the board of directors of a corporation
has the power to issue shares, 110 thereby potentially bringing in new stockholders.
Barring a valid share transfer restriction, individual shareholders can bring in new
owners by selling their stock."' In contrast, partners may assign their interests,
but the assignee does not, absent agreement of the other partners, become a new
partner.
112
California's LLC act, like most, presently follows the partnership model: It
takes unanimous consent of the existing members (unless otherwise agreed) for
a new member to enter the firm.'t 3 Like a partner, a member of a California LLC
can transfer his or her economic interest, but the transferee does not become a
member of the LLC (with the management rights of a member) without consent
of the other members."
4
Until recently, the reason for this rule lay in tax concerns. A unanimous
consent requirement ensured that the LLC avoided the corporate tax classification
factor of free transferability" 5 Hence, it was important to the goal of achieving
partnership tax treatment." 6 At the end of 1994, however, the Internal Revenue
108. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (1991).
109. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 202(d), (e)(1) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(4) (1991).
110. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 409 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 161 (1991).
111. See, e.g., Rafe v. Hindin, 288 N.Y.S.2d 662 (App. Div. 1968).
112. U.P.A. §§ 18(g), 27(1) (1986).
113. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17100(a)(1), 17303(a) (West Supp. 1996); cf ALA. CODE § 10-12-31(a)(1)
(1994); ALASKA STAT. § 0.50.155(1)(B) (Supp. 1995); ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-731(B)(Supp. 1995); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-32-801(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-701 (Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-301(b)(1) (Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.423 (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §
14-11-505(b) (Michie 1994); IDAHOCODE § 53-640(a) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, part. 180/10-1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODEANN. §23-18-6-1(1) (West 1994); IOWA CODEANN. § 490A.903(1) (West Supp.
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (1995); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 53(1) (Baldwin); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1332(A)(1) (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 691(1)(A) (West Supp. 1995);
MD.CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S § 4A-601(b)(1) (1993); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.4506(1) (West
Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.079(3)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-801(1)(a)
(1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:23(II)(a) (1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-21(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-36(A)(1)(Michie Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-01(b)(l)(Supp. 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2035(A)(2) (West Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.245(2)(a) (1995); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-16-36(a) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-232-102 (1995); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n,
art. 4.01(1)(1) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-122 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1038.1(1)
(Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.115 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-34(c)(1)
(Supp. 1994); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 183.0404(2)(b) (West Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1989). But see
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-179(a) (West Supp. 1995) (majority); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 602(b)(1)
(McKinney 1996) (majority).
114. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17301(a), 17303(a) (West Supp. 1996).
115. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
116. In order to obtain taxation as a partnership, an LLC can have no more than two of the following four
corporate characteristics: (1) limited liability; (2) central management; (3) free transferability of interests; and
(4) continuity of life. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229. By definition, an LLC's members have
limited liability and, if run by managers rather than members, an LLC likely has central management. Id.; Rev.
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Service issued Revenue Procedure 95-10,n 7 which clarified and liberalized the
requirements for an LLC to receive a ruling that it successfully avoided corporate
characteristics. With respect to avoiding free transferability, Revenue Procedure
95-10 stated that requiring unanimous consent for entry of an assignee as a new
member was not necessary; a majority vote requirement would be sufficient.118
This change has produced a predictable reaction: A bill was introduced in 1995
in the California Legislature that would amend the LLC act to reduce the require-
ment for admission of new members to a majority (absent other agreement)." 9
Such a knee-jerk reaction to tax law developments is potentially unfortunate.
The question should not be what rule constitutes the absolute minimum useful for
obtaining partnership tax status. Rather, the issue should be what is the best
default rule; in other words, given that this is a rule only for parties who have not
made their own agreement as to admission of new members, what rule best
matches the one such persons would most likely have agreed to had they thought
about the issue in advance?
In this regard, recall that partnership and corporate law have opposite default
rules, which arose out of concerns divorced from tax. The partnership law rule
presumably reflects the historical experience that parties usually want veto power
over new entrants in a business that is normally closely held,20 managed directly
by all its owners, 12' and where each owner can create potentially unlimited
personal liability for the other owners.12 By comparison, the corporate law norm
reflects a business with traditionally more widely held passive ownership (whose
primary role is the election of directors to manage the firm) with no personal
liability. Seen in this light, the unanimity rule makes sense for LLCs, independent
of tax concerns. True, the LLC is unlike the partnership in that members enjoy
limited liability. Nevertheless, LLCs normally will be more closely held (since
publicly traded firms are taxed as a corporation regardless of other factors'23).
Also, the LLCs in which owners are most likely not to have thought of the issue,
and so need default rules, would be those which are closely held. Moreover, the
default rule for California LLCs calls for direct governance by members,124 and
Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20. Hence, it is important to avoid the corporate characteristic of free transferability
of interests.
117. 1995-3 I.R.B. 20.
118. Id. § 5.02. Often overlooked regarding this issue is that the tax criterion is unconcerned with the
requirements for admission of parties who purchase their interest from the firm itself, rather than from existing
members. Id.
119. S.B. 141, 1995-96 Cal. Reg. Sess. §§ 9, 19, 20 (introduced by Senator Beverly, Jan. 24, 1995,
amended Aug. 1, 1995); see id. (proposing to amend CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17100, 17301, 17303).
120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
121. See U.P.A. § 18(e) (1914).
122. Id. §§ 9(l), 13, 14, 15 (1914).
123. I.R.C. § 7704 (1995).
124. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17150 (Vest Supp. 1996).
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gives each member authority to create liability for the firm, tz much like a
partnership. Under these circumstances, it is likely that most parties will wish a
veto over entry despite the absence of personal liability-witness the prevalence
in closely held corporations of restrictions on the owners' ability to transfer their
shares.
1 26
Beyond the question of whether to retain the current unanimity rule, the
California LLC act raises one other issue regarding entry of new members. Is it
possible to circumvent the rule through the use of LLC mergers? Recall that the
default rule for approval of an LLC merger is a majority vote. 27 Unless the
merger entails non-equity consideration for one side, the surviving LLC is
inevitably going to end up with new members. Indeed, what is to prevent a
majority in an LLC-who want to allow in new members, but face opposition
from a minority-from having the prospective new members form an LLC
simply for the purpose of undertaking a merger? If there is only one prospective
new member, there could be a problem forming a California LLC, since
California requires that LLCs have two members.12 This problem is easily over-
come either by forming the temporary new LLC in a jurisdiction which allows
one member LLCs,t 29 followed by a merger of the foreign into the California
LLC,t" or by creating a corporation solely owned by the individual desiring entry
to merge with the existing LLC.131 Of course, the dissenting minority can cash out
after the merger, 32 but this seems a poor substitute for the veto seemingly given
by the rule of unanimous consent to new entry. It is difficult to see that such a
tactic, in and of itself, breaches whatever might be the majority's fiduciary duty,
since the statute allows the end run. 33 Perhaps the minority's best bet would be
to argue that the merger effects an amendment to the operating agreement and so
requires a unanimous vote under section 17551(e). This seems true if the oper-
ating agreement specifies who the members are, but may be questionable
125. Id. § 17157(a) (West Supp. 1996).
126. See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 763 (1986) ("Shareholders who look ahead... will
usually want to restrict the transferability of their shares [in a closely held corporation].").
127. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
128. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17001(t), 17050(b) (West Supp. 1996).
129. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-201 (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 7-80-203 (West
Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-203 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-607 (1994); IND. CODE AN. § 23-18-2-4
(West 1994); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 4 (Baldwin); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 621 (West
Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.037(l) (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-201 (1994); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-19-7 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAw § 102(m) (MeKinney Supp. 1996); T)X.
Rv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 4.01 (West Supp. 1996).
130. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17555 (west Supp. 1996) (permitting merger of foreign and California
LLCs).
131. Id. § 17550(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996) (allowing merger of an LLC with a corporation).
132. Id. § 17601(a) (West Supp. 1996).
133. See, e.g., Kirschner Bros. Oil, Inc. v. Natomas Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 784, 791.229 Cal. Rptr. 899.
903 (1986) (structuring a merger in such a way as to deprive preferred shareholders of any statutory right to
vote did not breach any fiduciary duty).
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otherwise. Accordingly, this may be another reason to reconsider the majority
rule merger provision. In addition, a sale of substantially all assets to a new LLC
with new prospective members-in exchange for membership interests in the new
LLC to be distributed to old LLC members upon dissolution-could serve to
circumvent the unanimity requirement for admitting new members. This suggests
the need to consider sales of substantially all assets, as well.
3. Involuntary Exit: Expulsion of Members
Efforts by some owners of a business to expel (or "freeze-out," to use the
pejorative term) other owners have provided fertile fields for litigation.'34
Expulsions have occurred pursuant to an advance arrangement of the owners
granting this power-such as an expulsion clause in a partnership agreemente3,
or a provision in the articles of incorporation which gave the company the option
to redeem certain classes of stock.136 Alternately, expulsions have occurred
through the use of statutory procedures (such as mergers and dissolutions) whose
purposes seem directed toward ends other than the involuntary removal of some
owners by others. 37 California's LLC act raises issues with respect to both
categories of expulsions.
Section 17100(c) of California's LLC statute authorizes LLC operating
agreements containing expulsion clauses.13 While the overall thrust of section
17100(c) is unexceptional, two aspects of this section raise questions. To begin
with, if the operating agreement sets the conditions for expulsion, but fails to
specify the consequences, to what is the expelled member entitled? Section 17350
states that expulsion will cause dissolution and, therefore, presumably liquidation,
unless all the remaining members vote to continue139-- which is what one expects
134. See, e.g., O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 35, §§ 5.02 et. seq.; Franklin A. Gevurtz, Preventing
Partnership Freeze-outs, 40 MERcER L. REV. 535, 536 (1989).
135. See, e.g., Gelder Medical Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1977).
136, See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
137. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 675
(1942) (dissolution); Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 322 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. 1974) (reverse stock split);
Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986) (merger).
138. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17100(c) (West Supp. 1996); see id. (providing as follows:
The operating agreement may provide for the termination in whole or in part of the
membership interest or economic interest of a member in the limited liability company. If a
member's economic interest in the limited liability company is terminated pursuant to the operating
agreement, the member may demand and shall be entitled to receive a return of that member's
contribution. Any provision in an operating agreement governing the termination of a member's
interest and the return of a member's contribution shall be enforceable in accordance with its terms
unless the member seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that the provision was
unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time the agreement was made. Upon any
termination of a membership interest, the list required by paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section
17058 shall be amended accordingly).
139. Id. § 17350(d) (West Supp. 1996).
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the members normally will vote to do. After all, why bother to expel a member
if one plans only to dissolve and liquidate the business?"4' Section 17100(c) gives
expelled members the right to the return of their contribution (presumably, if
there is no dissolution and no other agreement). By comparison, section 17252(c)
grants members upon a "permitted withdrawal," which does not cause
dissolution, the right to receive the fair market value of their interest. 141 This does
not cover expulsions, since section 17350 lists "withdrawal" as a separate cause
of dissolution from "expulsion."142 The decision to give expelled members their
contribution back (rather than the fair market value of their interest) seems
curious. This could provide a windfall for the expelled member if the business has
sustained losses. Worse, if the business has done well, this would deprive the
expelled member of the benefit of retained profits and appreciation in the firm's
assets.
Next, what limits exist upon the power of expulsion? Section 17100(c) allows
an expelled member to challenge the expulsion agreement as unreasonable at the
time it was entered.43 Yet, what about challenges to the exercise of the power
under a provision, which in itself was not unreasonable? Specifically, is there any
good faith limit upon expulsion? This has been a contentious issue in partnership
law.' 44 Hence, section 17153's imposing upon managers of California LLCs the
fiduciary duties of a partner is not entirely helpful to resolve this question.
Moreover, as was discussed earlierthe California LLC act is silent regarding the
fiduciary duties of members acting as members when it comes to expulsion.45
This can be a problem if an operating agreement grants the power of expulsion
to members rather than managers in an LLC otherwise run by managers. In any
event, having created a financial incentive for expulsions if the LLC need only
return the expelled member's contribution, it would be useful to impose some
good faith requirement.
Of course, it is difficult to be overly sympathetic to parties who explicitly
agreed to be subject to expulsion but then complain when they get expelled. More
serious are the complaints of those expelled when the governing agreement never
explicitly provided this power, but, instead, majority interests use various
provisions of the statute to freeze-out the minority. California's LLC act makes
a valiant effort to deal with this problem. This might serve as a model for other
140. But see Zahn v. Transamerica Corp. 162 F.2d 36, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1947) (describing the circum-
stances where a corporation liquidated following a redemption which was motivated by the desire to prevent
the minority stockholders from sharing in the appreciation of the corporation's assets).
141. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17252(c) (West Supp. 1996).
142. See id. § 17350(d) (West Supp. 1996).
143. Id. § 17100(c) (West Supp. 1996).
144. See, e.g., Gill v. Mallory, 80 N.Y.S.2d 155, 158 (App. Div. 1948) ("It does not appear that
defendants acted in bad faith [by expelling partners] (if that were to be the test) .... [emphasis added]).
145. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions which have been less thoughtful. Unfortunately, California's effort
is somewhat incomplete.
Probably the most common tool used by majorities in corporations to expel
minorities is the freeze-out merger." The majority sets up a new shell
corporation which it then merges with the preexisting company under a plan of
merger which gives the minority cash (or other non-equity consideration) for the
minority's shares. In an apparently unthinking effort to mimic features of
corporate law that are handy in combining or acquiring businesses, LLC statutes
in many jurisdictions allow mergers of LLCs based upon majority approval and
with non-equity consideration-thereby creating the tools for freeze-out LLC
mergers. 47 Allowing such freeze-out mergers represents poor policy for two
reasons.
To begin with, it is questionable whether granting the majority the power to
expel the minority at will-subject only to the vagaries of fiduciary duty
litigation-represents a sound default rule. Is this really the rule most parties who
enter LLCs would have agreed to if they thought about the subject in advance?' 48
Even if the legislature wished to give majorities the freeze-out power, merger
provisions are a poor tool to do it. The problem is that many parties forming an
LLC will not realize the hidden potential of the merger provisions in time to reach
another agreement if that is what they wish.
149
Seen in this light, California's merger provision represents a step in the right
direction-assuming one concludes it is really useful to have provisions allowing
LLC mergers based upon majority vote and with non-equity consideration.
Section 17551 (b) of California's LLC act prevents the use of consideration other
than non-redeemable equity interests in the surviving LLC (or its parent)-unless
all the recipient members consent-when an LLC merges with another entity in
which it or its "parent" owns the majority of voting interests.'5° By limiting
consideration in this manner, the provision generally prevents freeze-out LLC
mergers over the opposition of the frozen out parties.
Still, there are gaps in this protection. Some are intentional. Section 17551 (b)
creates exceptions if the minority frozen out is smaller than 10 percent or if the
State's Corporations Commissioner approves the fairness of the transaction.1
These provisions track California's corporations statute. 2 Except for this origin,
the rationale for these two exceptions is unclear. For example, why-other than
146. See, e.g., Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986).
147. See Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 530-32.
148. See Alan R. Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution--Causes, Consequences and Cures, 43 TEX. L.
REV. 631, 653 (1965) (explaining that partnership agreement expulsion clauses are "quite rare" in the author's
experience).
149. See Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 533-34.
150. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17551(b) (West Supp. 1996).
151. Id.
152. Id. §§ 1101, 1101.1 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
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perhaps as some historic tie to short form merger provisions' 53-- should less than
ten percent ownership interests exist at the suffrage of the majority? Also, what
standards will the Commissioner apply to determine if a freeze-out merger is
"fair": A fair price? A business purpose? These questions have plagued courts in
fiduciary duty litigation over freeze-out mergers. 54 At the very least, it might be
helpful to have some statutory guidelines on these questions-perhaps giving the
majority the right of expulsion only when it can establish wrongful conduct by
the minority along lines similar to the minority's rights to dissolution in section
1735 1.155
Other gaps in California's protection against freeze-outs are inadvertent. To
begin with, section 17551(b)'s limitation on non-ownership consideration only
applies if either the merging LLC or its "parent" owns a majority in the other
merging firm.' Section 17001(ad) defines "parent" as a "person" who owns over
50 percent of the voting power in an LLC,' 57 while section 17001 (ae) defines
"person" to include an individual, partnership, limited partnership, trust, estate,
association, corporation, LLC or other entity. 58 This will cover the situation in
which the majority attempting the freeze-out merger constitutes one individual or
entity. Yet, what if a group of persons, who together but not individually have a
majority interest, attempt to freeze out a minority? This is not an unlikely scenario
in a closely held business,' 9 especially if families are involved.
Beyond this question, note that California's corporations statute contains
provisions addressing freeze-outs through mergers,' 60 reverse stock splits,' 6' and
sales of substantially all assets. 62 Reverse stock splits are not relevant to LLCs.
t63
Sale of substantially all assets to a new LLC owned only by the prior firm's
majority can be a viable freeze-out technique, however, for LLCs. As discussed
earlier, it is very possible that the majority interest in a California LLC has the
power to approve a sale of substantially all assets.' 64 At the very least, therefore,
153. Id. § 1110 (West Supp. 1996).
154. Compare Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 28 (N.Y. 1984) (requiring a corporate
purpose for a freeze-out merger) with Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124-25 (Del. 1977)
(finding the majority's business purpose adequate to meet the business purpose requirement) and with
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711,715 (Del. 1983) (stating that proof of a business purpose was
no longer required, as only a "fair price" and "fair dealing" were necessary).
155. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351(a)(5) (West Supp. 1996).
156. Id. § 17551(b) (West Supp. 1996).
157. Id. § 17001(ad) (West Supp. 1996).
158. Id. § 17001(ac) (West Supp. 1996).
159. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660-61 (Mass. 1976)
(discussing the case where three of four equal shareholders joined to squeeze-out fourth).
160. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1101, 1101.1 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996).
161. Id. § 407 (West 1990).
162. Id. § 1001(d), (e) (West 1990).
163. Nothing in the LLC act authorizes the cash-out of fractional shares after an article
amendment-presumably because LLCs normally do not issue shares.
164. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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it would be worthwhile to amend the California LLC act to clarify that such
power does not extend to asset sales for non-equity consideration to entities
owned by those in control of the selling LLC.
Dissolution can also lead to freeze-outs in partnerships and corporations.6
Partners or majority shareholders might dissolve the firm with the plan of
acquiring the business in the ensuing liquidation. California's LLC statute, unlike
most, allows dissolution by majority vote (barring agreement otherwise).,t
However, in the liquidation following dissolution, members who are the target of
the freeze-out may be able to turn the tables by outbidding their rivals for the
business.' 67 Hence, California may have dealt with this as well as can be done.16
4. Voluntary Exit: Cash-out Rights
Partnership law follows what one might label a buy-out approach to dealing
with the departure of partners: If a partner wants to leave the firm, his or her
fellow partners must buy out his or her interest if the other partners wish to
continue the business. Specifically, under the Uniform Partnership Act, including
as adopted in California, each partner (barring other agreement) has the right to
dissolve the partnership at any time and demand liquidation.' 69 In that instance,
the other partners, if they want to continue the venture, must either attempt to
purchase the business in the liquidation sale or else reach an agreement with the
departing partner to buy out his or her interest. Partners can change this by
agreeing to a partnership for a term. Even in this case, however, a partner can
165. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1961); Lebold v. Inland
Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941).
166. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17350(c) (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-37(2) (1994); ALASKA
STAT. § 10.50.400(2) (Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-781(A)(2)(Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 4-32-901(b) (Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(b) (Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 18-801(3) (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441(1)(b) (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-308(b)(1),
14-11-602(3) (Michie Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 53-642(2) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/35-1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-9-1(2) (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.1301(2)
(West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(2) (1995); 1994 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 57(2)
(Baldwin); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-902(2) (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 701(2)
(west Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450A80(c) (west Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.137(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-901(2) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2622(2) (Supp. 1994);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 86-491(1)(b) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:50(I1) (1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. §
42:2B-48(c) (West Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-6-01(3) (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
2037(A)(2) (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.621(3) (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-34-29(2)
(Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 245-101(b)(2) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046(2) (Michie Supp. 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.270(3) (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-35(2) (Supp. 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 183.0901(2) (West Supp. 1995); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-123(a)(ii) (1989).
167. See Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 527-28.
168. After all, if the parties do not get along, determining who gets the business through competitive
bidding may be at least as reasonable as a contest over who withdraws from the firm last.
169. U.P.A. §§ 31(1)(b), 38(1) (1914); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15031(1)(b), 15038(a) (West 1990).
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depart at any time and force a buy-out-but at a much less favorable price and
with the possibility of no payment until expiration of the term.70
Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), limited partnerships
also follow a buy-out model, albeit under a somewhat different scheme. A general
partner's departure triggers dissolution and liquidation barring other agreement
or consent of the partners. 171 A limited partner's departure, however, does not.
72
In lieu of liquidation rights, the ULPA gives general partners the right to get the
fair value of their interest when their departure does not result in dissolution and
gives limited partners the right to withdraw and cash out at fair value upon six
months' notice.173 This, of course, is subject to other agreement, which might
provide departing partners more or less favorable price and terms.
174
By contrast, corporations follow what one might call a free transfer model.
If a stockholder wants out, the corporation and other stockholders may continue
unaffected. Instead, in the absence of other agreement, it is up to the departing
shareholder to sell his or her stock to whomever he or she desires or can find to
buy the stock. 75
California's LLC act, like most of the other LLC acts, 76 follows a limited
partnership style buy-out scheme. As with the withdrawal of a general partner
from a limited partnership, departure of a member from a California LLC will
trigger dissolution unless otherwise agreed or all the remaining members consent
to continue the company without dissolution. Avoiding dissolution and
liquidation, however, does not render a member's interest illiquid. Instead, the
California LLC act follows the limited partnership model by allowing LLC
members, in the absence of contrary agreement, to withdraw and cash out at fair
value on six months' notice (or without notice if the member is under an
obligation to render services to the firm).78
The principal motivating factor for following a limited partnership rather than
a corporate departure model in LLC statutes has been tax. The drafters were
trying to avoid the corporate characteristic of continuity of existence in order to
obtain taxation as a partnership. 179 In fact, however, tax concerns do not compel
the cash-out right, since continuity of existence involves maintaining the
170. U.P.A. §§ 31(2), 38(2) (1914); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15031(2), 15038(b) (West 1990).
171. U.L.P.A. § 801(4) (1976).
172. See id. § 801.
173. See id. §§ 603, 604 (1976).
174. See id. § 604.
175. See GEVURrz, supra note 2. at 58.
176. See Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 513-14 n.94 (listing comparable provisions in various state statutes).
177. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 17350(d) (West Supp. 1996).
178. id. § 17252(a)(1), (b), (c) (West Supp. 1996).
179. See supra note 116.
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possibility of entity dissolution, not individual owner departure 80 Hence, the
cash-out right must find its justification in non-tax concerns.
Recent legislative developments compel a reexamination of the justification
for a cash-out right. By virtue of a 1994 amendment, California's limited
partnership statute departed from the ULPA to no longer give limited partners the
right to withdraw and cash out (barring other agreement) on six months' notice. 81
Paralleling this development, a sponsor of California's LLC act introduced a bill
to amend the act, which, among other things, would change the cash-out right for
LLC members as well. As originally drafted, this bill sought to replace the right
to cash out at fair market value, to be paid a reasonable time after withdrawal,
with an entitlement only to "the share of profits and distributions to which the
member would have been entitled if the member had not withdrawn.' ' 82 This
language appeared to leave the withdrawing member, unless otherwise agreed,
waiting around for the same distributions he or she would have received without
withdrawing, instead of receiving a reasonably prompt payment upon withdrawal
based upon the discounted present value of the right to future profits and
distributions. In other words, it would have pretty well destroyed the cash-out
right. Subsequent amendments to this bill have narrowed the scope of this change.
As presently drafted, the change only applies to a family controlled limited
liability company. Instead of eliminating the cash-out right for such companies,
the bill reduces the price due the withdrawing member. He or she will only be
entitled to the lesser of liquidation value or his or her right to share in reasonably
anticipated future distributions based upon a 25 year remaining business life. 83
Whether this will be the final shape of the bill remains to be seen.
The impetus for this change lies in a concern with estate taxes. Under Internal
Revenue Code section 2704 and the regulations issued pursuant thereto, state law
default rules may establish a minimum value for computing estate tax on interests
in a family controlled business held in a decedent's estate.' 84 In other words, if
state law provides, barring other agreement, limited partners or members in an
LLC with the right to cash out at fair market value, then the minimum value of
an interest in a family controlled business for estate tax purposes is the fair market
value that the decedent's estate hypothetically would have received if it exercised
this cash-out right, even though the actual limited partnership or LLC operating
agreement denied or otherwise limited such a cash-out right. Such a denial, of
course, means that the estate could not, in fact, cash out at the statutory fair
180. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20.
181. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15663 (West Supp. 1996).
182. S.B. 141, 1995-96 Cal. Reg. Sess. §§ 9, 10 (introduced by Senator Beverly, Jan. 24, 1995, amended
Aug. 1, 1995).
183. Id. As amended through August 1995. While the language of the bill is not entirely clear, it appears
to intend immediate payment of the present value of the future distributions.
184. See Jerald August, Planning for Lapsing Rights and Restrictions-The Impact of Section 2704 on
Valuation, 82 J. TAx'N 342, 345, 347 (1995).
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market value and this, in turn, presumably lowers the real value of the interest.
Hence, by lowering the price payable under the LLC act, the proposed
amendment can lower the estate tax.
In reacting to these estate tax rules, however, it is important to ask what is the
"tail" and what is the "dog." True, the impetus for LLC legislation lies in the
search for tax advantages. Yet, that does not mean the statute was designed to
milk every conceivable tax savings, no matter what the non-tax consequences. On
the contrary, the purpose of LLC legislation was to allow persons to obtain
partnership tax classification for income tax purposes without incurring non-tax
disadvantages (such as personal liability) in order to get the desired tax
treatment.185 Hence, it is important not to trade marginal tax advantages for
serious non-tax disadvantages.
Given this perspective, it is important to examine the purpose of the cash-out
provision. This provision is a default rule-in other words, a right which exists
only if not otherwise agreed. 186 Default rules exist because of the reality that
parties enter business dealings with less than perfect sophistication and
forethought. Inevitably, many parties will neglect to make their own agreement
upon various issues that arise and then will look to the law for a rule. A number
of approaches exist for setting default rules.18 7 A common one is to determine
what most parties would have agreed to had they thought about the issue at the
start.18
8
Applying this criterion, the fair market value cash-out right appears to be an
appropriate default rule for the sort of closely held businesses likely to become
LLCs. To understand why, it is useful to look at the two models that deal with
departure problems outlined at the beginning of this discussion. The buy-out
model, of which the cash-out right is a variant, is hardly a perfect solution. The
put option for any member on six months' notice creates a continuing liquidity
danger for the firm with limited access to ready cash. 8 9 Worse, a member might
opportunistically choose to exploit a lack of liquidity by threatening withdrawal
unless there is a renegotiation of terms."9 Yet, what are the alternatives? The
corporate free-transfer model is not viable. This is not only because owners in a
closely held business normally want to control who their associates are,' 9' but also
because free transfer often does not provide a very happy solution when there is
185. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
186. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17252(c) (West Supp. 1996).
187. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989).
188. See O'Kmi.EY & THOMPSON, supra note 104, at 48.
189. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations andAgency Costs, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 271,289 (1986).
190. Id. at 287.
191. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
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no outsider interested in buying into a closely held firm. 92 Tax considerations
compound this conclusion for an LLC. As noted earlier, restricting free transfer
may be necessary in order to obtain partnership tax treatment. 93 What one ends
up with then is a third model: that of no exit. The history of closely held
corporations-in which this model often exists as the practical result of a lack of
market, if not as a legal result of share transfer restrictions-has been a gloomy
one. Indeed, many writers attribute the frequent oppression of minority share-
holders in closely held corporations in large part to this model.' 94
Yet, the notion of no exit is not an entirely accurate description. A party can
almost always sell out to the firm's other owners if he or she sells cheaply
enough.195 Moreover, partnership law and many jurisdictions' corporate law pro-
vide a judicially imposed escape for the party who can show sufficient wrongful
conduct by the other owners.1. (LLC statutes, including California's, commonly
contain similar provisions 97). The end result is to create a regime analogous to
the old family law rules requiring fault for divorce. Here, in order to avoid selling
at a sacrifice, parties run to court seeking an out. Unfortunately, this regime in the
business context is subject to much the same criticism that led to no-fault divorce.
If two or more parties in a close working relationship, be it business or family (or
often both), cannot get along, attempting to determine who, if anyone, is at fault
is likely to be both an expensive and ultimately unsatisfactory undertaking. The
expense of litigating highly involved questions of fault imposes costs both for the
192. See O'NEAL &THOMPSON, supra note 35, § 2.15.
193. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
194. E.g., J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977).
195. See id.
196. U.P.A. § 32(1)(b)-(d) (1914); see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West 1990); N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
197. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17351 (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-38 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.50.405 (Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-785 (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-902
(Michie Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-802 (Supp. 1995); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-207 (West
Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802(a) (Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.441(2) (West Supp.
1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-603(a) (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-643 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805,
para. 180/35-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-9-2 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §
490A.1302 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7629 (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 58
(Baldwin); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1335 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 702 (West Supp.
1995); MD. CODE ANN., CoRPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-903 (1993); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.4802 (West Supp.
1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.833(1) (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.143(2) (Vernon Supp. 1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-902 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2622 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.331(4)
(1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:51 (1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-49 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-19-40 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 702 (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 57C-6-02(5) (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-119 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2038 (West
Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.661 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-40 (1992); S.D. CODiPED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-34-30 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-245-902(a) (1995); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n,
art. 6.02 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-142 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1047 (Michie
1993); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 25.15.275 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-36 (Supp. 1995); Wts.
STAT. ANN. § 183.0902 (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-120(c) (Supp. 1994).
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parties and also for society (which maintains the courts). The result is ultimately
unsatisfactory because the resolution of fault in such contests-in which one may
be dealing as much with emotionally charged perceptions as with reality-is
likely to be no more accurate than flipping a coin.198 In the end, this seems a poor
way to assure a fair price.
This suggests that a default rule allowing parties a no-fault buy-out at fair
market value-as currently part of California's LLC act-represents the rule
closest to what most parties would agree to if they consider the issue in advance.
While this may create some added estate taxes for parties in a family controlled
business who choose a different agreement, that seems outweighed by non-tax
factors in this situation. Certainly, as the proposed amendment now recognizes,
this balance holds for all LLCs which are not family controlled. Yet, given the
potential for conflict even (or perhaps especially) in a family controlled
enterprise, t99 the balance favors the no-fault cash-out at fair market value there as
well. Indeed, the transfer of an interest upon death is precisely when there may
be the most need for a cash-out right. Under California's LLC act, the surviving
members can avoid dissolution and liquidation following a member's death.20 At
the same time, they can veto entry of the heirs as new members. 20' Under these
circumstances, it seems only fair that the heirs have a right to cash out at fair
market value. Moreover, while the remaining members might dissolve the LLC
upon a member's death or withdrawal with the hope of buying the business in the
liquidation,2 2 the need to deal with the firm's debts2°3 and the risks of other
bids makes this a chancy route to follow. Hence, one cannot argue the proposed
lower liquidation or distribution value necessarily reflects a realistic price.
198. See, e.g., Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 281, 287 (Alaska 1983) ("in many instances, the
evidence in this case consisted of the word of one partner against that of the other"); Saballus v. Timke, 460
N.E.2d 755, 761 (11. 1983) ("it would be difficult to decide which of the parties is most in the wrong");
Nupetco Assocs. v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 882-83 (Utah 1983) (finding that "voluminous trial transcript"
showed that the partners' contentions "were widely conflicting and were accompanied by extravagant
accusations of breach by the other party," and that neither party proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that the other breached the agreement); Susman v. Venture, 449 N.E.2d 143. 148 (I11. 1982) (reviewing
conflicting evidence as to which party breached the agreement); Lunn v. Kaiser. 72 N.W.2d 312, 314 (S.D.
1955) (declaring that the court was unable to determine whether one partner was more responsible for the
discord than the other); Drashner v. Sorenson, 63 N.W.2d 255,258-59 (S.D. 1954) (stating that evidence on
fault was sharply in conflict).
199. My father-who had considerable experience in this regard-once remarked to me that one could
not devise, if one tried, a more effective mechanism to sew discord than a family business.
200. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17350(d) (West Supp. 1996).
201. d. § 17303(a) (West Supp. 1996). While some family members will already have voting interests
in their own right (say, a favored son brought in to take over the business), other family members (say, a
daughter) may only receive their interests as heirs.
202. Id. § 17350(d) (West Supp. 1996).
203. Id. § 17353 (West Supp. 1996).
204. See supra note 167.
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5. Alteration of the Contract Between the Members
Under California's LLC act, as is typical of LLC acts generally, the operating
agreement normally sets out most of the rights of the members vis- -vis each
other.205 The major exception to this is that if the parties desire governance by
managers, rather than directly by members, they must place a provision to that
effect in the company's articles of organization. 6 Hence, the operating agree-
ment generally dictates the most critical aspects of the members' relationship,
including the allocation of profit and loss, 20 7 rights to distributions 208 and rights
to other compensation.209 This, in turn, raises the question of whether these rights
are subject to alteration by amendment of the operating agreement over the
objection of any member.
205. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17001(ab), 17005(a) (West Supp. 1996); cf. ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-2(j), 10-
12-24 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.110, 10.50.150, 10.50.990(15) (Supp. 1995); ARrz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 29-601(11), 29-681, 29-682 (Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-102(k), 4-32-401 to.4-32-404 (Michie
Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-102(11), 7-80-108(1) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-
101(14), 34-140 to 34-143 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101(7), 18-301(b)(1), 18-302
(1993 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.402(13), 608.423 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-
11-101(18), 14-11-204, 14-11-301 (Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601(11), 53-616 to -618, -621 to -625
(1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-5, 180/10-1 to 180/10-5, 180115-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-16, 23-18-4-5 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.703, 490A.705 (West Supp.
1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Serv. ch. 275, § 3(13), 33-37 (Baldwin); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1305(c), 12:1315-:1316, 12:1318 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 651,
653, 654 (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASSN'S § 4A-402 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
322B.03(33), 322B.603 (West 1995); MicH. CONw. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4102(n), 450.4501 to .4502,450.4505
(West Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.015(13), 347.079, 347.081 (Vernon Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-8-102(16), 403-404,502,704, (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2603(10), 21-2618, (Supp. 1994);
NEv. R v. STAT. §§ 86.101, 86.281(10), 86.291, 86.341, 86.351 (1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-
C:I(VI), 304-C:24 (1995); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-22 (%Vest Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-2(0),
15-18, 21-25 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 417 (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
57C-1-03(16), 57C-3-01 to -05, -20 to -21, -32 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-68, 10-32-50 (1995);
OHIo RE v. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01(J), 1705.09, 1705.12, 1705.14, 1705.15, 1705.18 (Anderson Supp. 1994);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2001(17), 2003(11), 2020,2024,2033,2035 (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 63.057,63.130,63.150,63.180 (1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8903 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 7-16-
15, 7-16-19,7-16-21,7-16-25, (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-102(L), 33-43-202, 33-43-401(B), 33-43-402
to 404 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIrIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-34-1(6), 47-34-22,47-34-25 (Supp. 1995);
TENN. CODEANN. §§ 48-206-101, 48-216-101, 48-218-101, 48-218-102, 48-224-101 (1995); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.09, art. 2.23, art. 4.02,4.05 (West Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-126,
48-2b-122,48-2b-131 (1994); VA. CODEANN. §§ 13.1-1023, 13,1-1022, 13.1-1038.1, 13.1-1039, 13.1-1040,
(Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 25.15.005(5), 25.15.040, 25.15.115, 25.15.120,
25.15.140,25.15.150,25.15.155,25.15.250 (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-IA-19, 31-1A-18, 31-lA-
20, 31-IA-32, 31-1A-34, (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102(16), 183.401 to 404, 704, 706, 801
(West Supp. 1995); WYo. STAT. §§ 17-15-116, 17-15-122 (1989).
206. CAL CORP. CODE § 17151(b) (West Supp. 1996).
207. Id. § 17202 (West Supp. 1996).
208. Id. §§ 17250, 17251 (West Supp. 1996).
209. Id. § 17004(b) (West Supp. 1996).
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LLC acts vary in answering this question. Some follow a corporate law
model2 0 allowing, at least in the absence of contrary agreement by the parties, a
majority of members to amend the operating agreement.2" California, however,
like most LLC acts, follows an approach consistent with partnership law212 and
requires (barring other agreement) unanimity to amend the operating agree-
ment.2 t3 In so doing, California made the correct choice.
The obvious problem with sanctioning amendment of the operating
agreement by majority vote is that it enables the majority to alter the fundamental
division of power and profit in ways the parties would never have agreed to
allow. For example, the abuse is evident if a party with 51 percent of the profits
and voting power could simply amend the agreement to increase his or her profit
share to 99 percent (particularly if he or she made no added contributions). To
deal with this problem, statutes allowing amendment with less than unanimity
might exclude certain subjects from the majority's reach.214 Yet, this poses extra-
ordinarily difficult challenges for drafting. For example, if the statute allowed the
majority to amend anything but the profit allocation, what about the payment of
salaries or other compensation to some members? What if some members make
additional contributions? More fundamentally, California's unanimity require-
ment is consistent with the generally held notion that a contract is not subject to
unilateral alteration unless specifically so provided,215 and, thus, poses less danger
of unfair surprise for members of an LLC.
210. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (1991) (requiring a majority vote to amend articles).
211. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.150(c) (Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34.142(b) (West
Supp. 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1318(B)(6) (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-17(B)(1) (Michie
Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LLAB. Co. LAW § 402(c)(3) (McKinney 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2020(B)(4)
(West Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.150(3)(c) (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-21(b)(5) (1992); TENN.
CODEANN. §§ 48-206-102,48-209-103(e) (1995); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.23(D)(1) (West
Supp. 1996); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209(0 (1993) (allowing amendment by majority vote
through merger); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1995) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322.B.603,
605 (West 1995) (permitting amendment by majority of board members); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, par. 180/5-
20(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (requiring two-thirds vote to amend articles, which can trump operating
agreement).
212. U.P.A. § 18(h) (1914).
213. CAL. CORP. CODE §17103(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1996); see id. (requiring unanimity to amend the
articles of organization, as well); cf. ALA. CODE § 10-12-24(b) (1994); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(c)(1)
(Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-403(b)(1) (Miehie Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-308(b)(5)
(Michie 1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-623(2)(a) (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-3(c)(1) (West 1994); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 490A.701(3) (West Supp. 1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 653(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995);
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSN'S § 4A-402(b)(2) (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.079(3)(1) (Vernon Supp.
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-403(2)(a) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:24(VI)(a) (1994); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-03(1) (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1023(B)(1) (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 25.15.120(2)(a) (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-19(b)(2) (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 183.0404(2)(a) (West. Supp. 1995).
214. See, e.g., N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW §§ 402(e), 417(b) (MeKinney Supp. 1995).
215. See, e.g., Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630,634-36 (R.I. 1974).
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Given this requirement of unanimity to amend the operating agreement, the
question becomes can a majority in a California LLC circumvent this rule? One
common technique for altering the financial interests of shareholders in a
corporation (including amending the organic documents of the company) is
through a merger with a shell company, the impact of which is not really to
combine different firms, but, rather, to alter the rights within one corporation.
216
Could a voting majority in an LLC use this technique? In some jurisdictions, most
notably Delaware,2 7 the answer is yes. To their credit, the drafters of California's
LLC statute recognized this danger and attempted to deal with it. Unfortunately,
ambiguity mars the attempt.
The pertinent language is in section 17551 (e) of the California Corporations
Code:
An agreement of merger approved in accordance with subdivision (a)
may effect any amendment to the operating agreement of any constituent
limited liability company or effect the adoption of a new operating
agreement for a constituent limited liability company if it is the surviving
limited liability company in the merger.... Notwithstanding the above
provisions of this subdivision, if a greater number of members is required
to approve an amendment to the operating agreement of the constituent
limited liability company than is required to approve the agreement of
merger pursuant to subdivision (a), and the number of members that
approve the agreement of merger is less than the number of members
required to approve an amendment to the operating agreement of the
constituent limited liability company, any amendment to the operating
agreement or adoption of a new operating agreement of the surviving
limited liability company made pursuant to the first sentence of this
subdivision shall be effective only if the agreement of merger is
approved by the number of members required to approve an amendment
to the operating agreement of the constituent limited liability company. 218
At first glance, the meaning of this provision, despite its rather convoluted
language, seems simple enough: Mergers receiving less than unanimous approval
cannot effect an amendment of the operating agreement of a constituent LLC
(unless the agreement expressly allowed amendment on less than unanimous
vote). Yet, this leaves questions unanswered. To begin with, what is the impact
216. See, e.g., Bove v. Community Hotel Corp., 249 A.2d 89, 93 (R.I. 1969) (holding that a merger
between a parent corporation and its subsidiary is permissible even where the merger device is used for the sole
purpose of avoiding the unanimous vote requirement which would otherwise be necessary to cancel the
priorities of preferred shareholders).
217. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-209(b), (f) (Supp. 1994).
218. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17551(e) (West Supp. 1996).
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of this provision on the validity of the merger itself; specifically, is a merger
which receives a majority, but not a unanimous, vote invalid or is just the
amendment ineffective? If the merger is valid, but the amendment ineffective,
then how can one decide what provisions govern the surviving firm on the points
on which the agreements of the two constituent firms disagreed? Will the mere
labeling of one LLC as the "surviving" firm mean that its agreement controls? If,
on the other hand, the merger is invalid, then could the end result be to trump the
general rule that a majority can approve an LLC merger, for all but the few cases
in which the operating agreements of the merging LLCs are mirror images of
each other?
This, in turn, highlights the question of when a merger effects any amend-
ment of an operating agreement. A simple hypothetical illustrates the problem.
Suppose there are two LLCs, each of which has three members. The operating
agreement of each calls for all members to receive an equal one-third share of the
firm's profits. Would a merger between the two firms under an agreement which
calls for each member to receive an equal one-sixth profit share effect any
amendment of the operating agreements? If one focuses on the equal sharing
aspect of the original agreements, then there appears to be no alteration. If,
however, one focuses on the one-third share aspect of the original agreements,
then the conclusion is to the contrary. In deciding which interpretation to adopt,
a court naturally may be inclined to look to language differences: Did the agree-
ments refer to "equal shares" or "one-third shares?" The problem is that from the
standpoint of the drafters of the original agreements, this language was sub-
stantially equivalent and, therefore, the words chosen could have been largely
accidental. The same ambiguity can exist if the agreement follows the statutory
default rule of profit sharing in proportion to contributions, since it may be quite
common in drafting such an agreement to specify the actual percentage of profit
interests in order to avoid disputes later as to what was the ratio of contributions
and, hence, profits.219
Faced with this problem, one temptation may be to read section 17551(e)
narrowly so as to avoid eclipsing the majority rule principle of section 17551 (a).
For example, a court might interpret the "effect any amendment" language not to
encompass the alteration of profit shares virtually inevitable upon merging of two
LLCs. More broadly, one might assert that the merger of one LLC into another,
under a plan which leaves the surviving LLC's operating agreement unchanged,
does not effect any amendment despite whatever changes this means for the rights
of members of the disappearing LLC. The basis for this construction lies in
section 17551 (e)'s references to the "surviving limited liability company." Yet,
the impact of the latter construction is to create a huge disparity in the voting
219. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: BEYOND THE BASICS 173, 182, 202, 228 (1995) (form operating agreement specifying each
member's percentage profits interest).
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rights of the members of two merging LLCs, depending upon the artificial
distinction of which firm receives the label of survivor. This is contrary to the
repeated efforts in the California corporations statute to prevent form trumping
substance in reorganizations?20 Moreover, reading section 17551(e) narrowly
opens dangerous prospects for abuse. A hypothetical illustrates why. Suppose A,
B and C are equal members of an LLC. A and B feel they should receive an
increase in their profit shares. C demurs. A and B cannot amend the operating
agreement (barring a contrary provision in the document) to increase their shares
over C's objection. Yet, if section 17551(e) does not apply, what would stop A
and B from forming a new LLC owned by themselves, which they then merge
with the existing LLC, thereby increasing their profit shares?
One further ambiguity in section 17551(e) may prove even more telling.
Suppose a California LLC merges into a foreign LLC so the foreign LLC is the
survivor; does this "effect any amendment" of the California LLC's operating
agreement? After all, changing the law governing the LLC could significantly
change the rights of the parties. For example, the majority voting interest in a
Delaware LLC may amend the operating agreement by merger-something the
majority could not do (barring other agreement) in California. Hence, unless one
interprets section 1755 1(e) to apply to a merger which changes the governing law
for a California LLC, majorities can circumvent the statute by merging into a
shell Delaware LLC, which then merges again with another shell LLC in order
to effect an amendment.
One might respond to these concerns about amendments through mergers by
pointing to the objecting minority's possible ability to challenge the action as a
breach of the majority's fiduciary duty221 or to demand a cash-out of the
minority's interest pursuant to section 17601. 2 The problem with relying on the
protection of fiduciary duty is that with its vague legal contours and need to
resolve what are often highly contested issues of fact, it tends to promote costly
litigation with questionable outcomes. Regarding appraisal rights, why should the
majority be able to force the minority into a choice between exit from the firm or
changing the contract when that is not what the parties originally agreed? By
contrast, section 17252(a)(2) of California's LLC act grants cash-out rights to
those dissenting from an amendment, but only when the members agreed to allow
amendments over opposition.2z Of course, one might deem the parties' original
220. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
221. As discussed earlier, it is not clear that members of an LLC have any fiduciary duty when voting
as members. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text. Significantly, however, Califorina Corporations
Code § 17613(c) imposes upon a party controlling both sides in a reorganization (including a merger) the
burden of proving that the transaction is just and reasonable to the minority. Still, it is uncertain if this
provision will apply if no one "party," as opposed to a group of persons, are in control of the merging LLCs.
222. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17601-17606 (West Supp. 1996) (providing appraisal rights for members
dissenting from an LLC merger or other reorganization).
223. Id. § 17252(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
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contract to include the provisions of California's LLC statute, but any ability to
circumvent sections 17103(2)(C) and 17551(e) would not have been readily
apparent to most individuals forming a California LLC. Finally, it is usefil to
note that under partnership law, partners who attempt to unilaterally alter the
partnership agreement-even if constituting a majority-are the ones who may
need to leave the firm.224
This discussion suggests the legislature should amend section 17551 (e). One
possibility is to broaden it. Recognizing that almost all LLC mergers entail
alteration of the constituent firms' operating agreements in some sense, the rule
under section 17551(a) could be that all mergers must receive approval by the
same vote as necessary to amend the merging firms' operating agreements. This
would avoid questions as to what mergers "effect any amendment" to the
operating agreement. Alternately, the legislature might narrow section 17551 (e).
The primary abuse occurs with a merger undertaken to amend the operating
agreement, rather than to combine different businesses. Hence, section 1355 1(e)'s
high vote requirement could apply only to mergers with LLC's under common
control (much as with the freeze-out merger rule in section 17551 (b)).
Beyond mergers, a sale of substantially all assets to a new LLC in exchange
for interests in the new firm, followed by a dissolution of the old firm and a
distribution of the new interests, could serve as a tool to amend an operating
agreement. This suggests again the need for California's LLC act to address sales
of substantially all assets.
H. CREDITOR PROTECTION ISSUES
A. Distributions
In an ordinary partnership, creditors are presumably unconcerned about
distributions of money from the firm to its owners, because the owners have
unlimited personal liability.m Once one introduces limited liability, this changes.
If those with no personal liability could legally withdraw their original investment
at any time, they could deprive creditors of the cushion provided by this invested
capital, which the creditors may have relied upon in advancing money to the
business. Worse, the unscrupulous might take advantage of such a regime by
withdrawing money representing not only their investment, but also that obtained
through borrowing by the firm. For this reason, corporate law has long restricted
the payment of dividends by a corporation to its shareholders.
224. See, e.g., Vangel v. Vangel, .116 Cal. App. 2d 615. 623, 254 P.2d 919, 924 (1953) (finding a partner
who violated partnership agreement and usurped management guilty of wrongfully causing dissolution, thereby
enabling other partners to continue the business without him).
225. U.P.A. § 15 (1914).
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Traditionally, corporate statutes attempted to protect creditors by limiting
dividends to the amount of the company's "surplus. '226 Surplus, in turn, com-
monly refers to the amount by which the total worth of the corporation's assets
exceeds the sum of its debts and its "capital." 227 If one assumes (incorrectly, as
it turns out) that capital is what the shareholders paid the company for their stock,
then it is evident how this approach is supposed to protect creditors from both of
the dangers outlined above.
Two factors, however, have undermined the protection of this traditional
approach. To begin with, capital need not, under typical corporate statutes
following the traditional approach, equal at least the amount paid by shareholders
to the corporation for their stock. Instead, directors possess substantial discretion,
subject to limits based upon par value, to make only some of the purchase price
of stock represent capital.m More significantly, directors and shareholders can
take steps which will reduce capital, if not eliminate it altogether.2 29 The end
result is that the traditional statute generally does not prevent shareholders from
receiving dividends which effectively withdraw the equity cushion provided to
creditors by the stockholders' original investment.
More recent corporation statutes have responded to this phenomenon in
different ways. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) reacts
by giving up. Since the end result of the traditional statutes generally was not to
prevent dividends which reflected a return of the shareholders' original
investment, the MBCA simply eliminates the concept of capital as a limit on
corporate distributions. Instead, subject to an equitable solvency limit, and limits
for the protection of liquidation preferences, a corporation can declare a dividend
up to the amount by which its assets exceed its liabilitiesY °0 This, of course, will
leave no equity to cushion the company's creditors.
California takes another approach. Its corporations statute attempts to retain
an equity cushion for creditors by the use of a numerical test. California
Corporations Code section 500 allows a dividend under either of two conditions:
(1) the company may distribute a sum not in excess of the amount of the
corporation's retained earnings (the accumulation of net income for each year of
business, which the company neither subsequently lost nor distributed); or (2) if
there are insufficient retained earnings, the company can distribute a sum which
226. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (Supp. 1994); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (McKinney
1986). See generally BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS. JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 68-84 (3d ed. 1990).
227. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 102(a)(13) (McKinney
1986).
228. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 506 (McKinney 1986).
229. Such reductions can occur through the repurchase and cancellation of shares or through board
resolution (if necessary, coupled with amendment to the articles reducing par). See GEvURnz, supra note 2,
at 643-44, 646. Some jurisdictions, however, attempt to limit dividends to "earned surplus," which requires
subtracting everything paid for stock. E.g., ARIZ. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 10-045, 10-046 (1990).
230. REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(c) (1984) [hereinafter R.M.B.C.A.].
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leaves it with total assets in excess of 11 times its total liabilities and current
assets greater than its current liabilities (or greater than 11/4 times its current
liabilities if the company did not manage to earn more than its interest expense
in the prior two years).23
A second difficulty presented by both the traditional and the more recent
statutory tests is the need to put a dollar amount on the corporation's total assets.
Conventional accounting practice generally uses the cost of an asset, less
depreciation, as the amount placed on the books for the value of each asset.3
2
Suppose, however, a corporation's directors wish to declare a larger dividend than
this practice would allow: Can they argue that some assets have, in fact,
appreciated in value since their purchase? Decisions under the traditional statutes
were divided,ui a split reflected in the recent statutes. The RMBCA is permissive,
allowing directors to base their determination upon financial statements prepared
on the basis of accounting practices which are "reasonable in the circumstances"
or on a "fair valuation" or other method that is "reasonable. ' 234 California, in
contrast, mandates the corporation follow generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples in determining the dollar amount of its assets 5 This generally will
preclude revaluing assets at greater than their initial cost so as to declare more
dividends.z 6
Given how California's corporations statute addresses these two issues, one
might have expected California's new LLC Act to contain the same rules with
respect to distributions by an LLC to its members. The LLC Act, however, does
not meet this expectation. Instead, the drafters of California's LLC Act chose to
use the RMBCA as a model. Hence, subject to an equitable solvency test, and
limits to protect any liquidation preferences, a California LLC can make a dis-
tribution up to the amount by which its assets exceed its liabilities (rather than 11
times its liabilities).237 Moreover, in determining the value of its assets for this
purpose, the LLC need not use generally accepted accounting principles, but
instead can look to "a fair valuation" or accounting practices or any other method
that is "reasonable in the circumstances. ''zs This, of course, could allow upward
revisions in asset values.
231. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(a), (b) (West Supp. 1996).
232. See TED FIFLIS ET AL., ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS; TEACHING MATERIALS 79 (3d ed.
1984).
233. Compare Randall v. Bailey, 43 N.E.2d 43,49 (N.Y. 1942) with Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co.,
101 A. 898, 903-04 (Del. Ch. 1917).
234. R.M.B.C.A. § 6A0(d) (1984).
235. CAL. CORP. CODE § 114 (West 1990).
236. See Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 6 17 (1965).
237. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17254(a) (West Supp. 1996). This point is also true of the new LLP Act. Id.
§ 15053 (West Supp. 1996).
238. Id. § 17254(b) (West Supp. 1996).
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These provisions in California's LLC Act represent poor policy. To
understand why, it is useful to begin by considering the role which shareholder
equity plays in protecting creditors. One aspect is to provide a cushion against
downturns in the business. Far more significant, however, is the impact on
incentives. If individuals with no personal liability have no money of their own
invested in the business, they have an incentive to engage in what may be
unreasonably risky undertakings. 39
California, like most states, does not attempt to address this problem by
requiring any minimum capital for a corporation-presumably because of the
difficulty of setting a minimum capital which could sensibly apply to corporations
engaged in a multitude of differing businesses. The problem becomes potentially
both more dangerous and more subject to remedy, however, if one focuses solely
on withdrawal of money which shareholders invested in the corporation. This
situation is more dangerous because it is changing the incentive structure, after
creditors decided to deal with the company, to one which may have been
unacceptable had it been in place before. This situation is also more subject to
remedy because it does not require figuring out what should be the minimum
capital, but rather involves simply limiting the withdrawal of money once put in.
Of course, one could respond that creditors might create such protections for
themselves by contractually limiting dividends. Yet, the logical extension of this
argument is to eliminate all restrictions on distributions. The fact that the legis-
lature has chosen to make any restrictions presumably reflects a notion that
creditors should not be put to the added transaction costs of always needing to
specify limits on dividends. Seen in this light, California Corporations Code
section 500 is a reasonable attempt to craft a compromise between allowing
shareholders to withdraw funds no longer needed in the business, and protecting
creditors against excessive removal of equity.
Having made the judgment to limit the removal of equity in the corporate
context, there seems no rational reason to create a different rule for LLCs. In both
instances, every owner enjoys limited liability.2  The differing tax treatment of
LLCs is irrelevant to this question. Similarly, while the normally more closely
held status of LLCs may militate against following corporate law norms with
respect to internal management issues,24' this has little to do with justifying
different rules for creditor protection (indeed, creditor concerns with excessive
distributions may be greater in a closely held firm, where the owners likely are
239. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 89, 113 (1985). Imagine the incentives if one could gamble with another person's money, where one
would be out nothing if one lost, but could keep all winnings beyond a fixed interest rate if one won.
240. By way of comparison. in a limited partnership, the personal liability of the general partner(s) might
be expected to play the same role as owner's equity in curbing incentives toward excessively risky
undertakings. Hence, it is not inconsistent for the California limited partnership act to allow distributions which
effectively return the limited partners' contributions. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15666 (West Supp. 1996).
241. See supra notes 5-222 and accompanying text (Part 1).
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in direct control242). Hence, the LLC act should follow the same numerical limits
on distributions as imposed by the corporate statute.
A more complex question is whether California's LLC act should have
required adherence to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in deter-
mining if the value of the company's assets allows a distribution. The practical
issue here involves upward revisions in the value of the firm's assets-something
not generally allowed by GAAP. While it may be argued that some requirements
of GAAP-such as accrual accounting-could be unrealistic for a closely held
business,243 the corporations statute applies to closely held corporations and so
faces the same objection.244 At any event, curing this does not require allowing
the LLC to use a "fair valuation."
Reasonable views differ on the subject of asset revaluations. Historic costs
often have limited relation to the present value of a firm's assets.245 Hence, it may
seem unrealistic to limit the ability to make a distribution to a calculation based
upon historic cost. On the other hand, prior to realizing a profit upon actual
disposition of an asset, any upward revision is inherently speculative.246
Moreover, there is always a temptation for those desiring a distribution to err on
the side of more rather than less in any upward revaluation.
Without resolving this debate, what is important for present purposes is that
California decided this question in its corporations statute in favor of following
GAAP. Hence, the issue is whether there are grounds for having a different
answer in the LLC act. Generally, for the same reasons outlined in considering
the withdrawal of owner equity above, the answer is no. There is, however, one
exception. California's LLC act gives members (barring contrary agreement) the
right to withdraw upon six months' notice (or immediately if they are obligated
to provide services).247 Upon withdrawal, the member is entitled to payment of
the fair value of his or her interest.248 Determining such fair value requires going
beyond GAAP and looking to see what the business' assets are really worth.24 9
It would be anomalous if the withdrawing member then could not obtain payment
of this value because of a prohibition upon distributions by the firm which is
based upon historic cost. Moreover, not only is there an important business reason
for departing from historic cost in this context, but there is less danger to creditors
242. Closely held corporations often declare few dividends in order to avoid double taxation. See
GEVURTZ, supra note 2, at 384. This would not apply to LLCs taxed as partnerships.
243. See CALIFORNIA LLCs, supra note 4, § 6.46.
244. See, e.g., R.M.B.C.A. § 6A0 cmt. I 4.a.
245. See, e.g., In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 66-67 (Me.
1979).
246. See ROBERTW. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS § 8.7, at 181 (1989).
247. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17252(a)(1), (b) (West Supp. 1996).
248. Id. § 17252(c) (West Supp. 1996).
249. See, e.g., Curtis v. Campbell, 336 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1960) (finding that figures on a balance
sheet did not reflect the "true and correct financial condition" of a deceased partner's interest in a partnership).
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from doing so. At this point, the members stand in opposition to each other, with
the non-withdrawing members normally seeking the lowest possible valuation on
the firm's assets so as to pay the least to the withdrawing member.250 This should
serve as a check on inflated upward revisions in asset values for purposes of
making a distribution.
This suggests that the LLC act went too far in following the RMBCA, rather
than the California corporations statute, with respect to valuing assets for
purposes of distribution limits. The general rule should be to follow GAAP. An
exception, however, should exist for withdrawing distributions to members who
exercise their right to cash out at fair value.
B. Piercing the LLC
One of the most significant protections of creditors from the possible abuse
of limited liability in the corporate context comes from the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil. Under this doctrine, courts will disregard the existence of the
corporate entity and hold shareholders personally liable for its debt when those
shareholders have controlled the corporation and used that control in such a
manner as to perpetrate some fraud or injustice upon a corporation's creditor251
Such fraud or injustice may come from a number of actions. These include: (1)
undercapitalization; 252 (2) commingling of corporate and personal funds; 253(3)
transactions between the company and its shareholder(s) which do not bear the
indications of an arms length deal;5' (4) misrepresentations to creditors,55 (5)
assurances and other conduct which might lead a creditor to believe the share-
holder(s) stand behind the corporate debt;256 and (6) using the corporation to enter
contracts which there is no intent to perform
57
Section 17101(b) of California's new LLC act imports the doctrine of
piercing into the LLC context. It states that an LLC member shall be personally
liable generally to the same extent as a shareholder may be liable for the debt of
a corporation. 58 This makes sense, since the potential for abuse of limited
liability is the same in both entities. One problem with piercing in the corporate
context lies in its uncertain criteria and resulting unpredictable application.259 Yet,
250. See, e.g., id.
251. See, e.g., Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957).
252. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1961).
253. See, e.g., Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 335 P.2d 107 (1959).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Talbot v. Fresno-Pacific Corp., 181 Cal. App. 2d 425, 5 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1960).
257. See, e.g., Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806
(1962).
258. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 1996).
259. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036 (1991).
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even if this problem is susceptible to a legislative solution, the LLC statute would
not be the place to start-since this is a problem which would need addressing in
the corporations statute as well.
Section 17101(b) contains one special direction. It states that:
[T]he failure to hold meetings of members or managers or the failure to
observe formalities pertaining to the calling or conduct of meetings shall
not be considered a factor tending to establish that the members have
personal liability for any debt, obligation, or liability of the limited
liability company where the articles of organization or operating
agreement do not expressly require the holding of meetings of members
or managers.2 °
At first glance, this provision appears eminently sensible. The failure to hold,
or the informal handling of, meetings for which there is no legal requirement in
the first place should hardly be a factor for piercing. A difficulty, however, lies
in the possible negative implication of this provision. Will the failure to hold
meetings called for in the articles or operating agreement be a ground for
piercing? Concern that this could be the case has already led some writers to
suggest that members not include in their articles or operating agreements any
specific requirement for member or manager meetings.
2 61
This is an unfortunate development. In LLCs with more than several
members, and especially those choosing governance by managers, specifying in
a written agreement when there will be meetings (for example, to elect managers)
might'be handy to avoid later disputes among the membership.2 62 Why then
should the failure to observe meeting requirements intended for the benefit of the
owners in their relationship with each other be a factor against them when it
comes to liability to outsiders?
This raises the question of whether this caveat was really necessary. Section
17101(b) appears to be based upon section 300(e) of California's Corporation
Code. Section 300(e) provides that
The failure of a close corporation to observe corporate formalities
relating to meetings of directors or shareholders in connection with the
management of its affairs, pursuant to an agreement authorized by
260. CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(b) (West Supp. 1996).
261. CALIFORNIA LLCs, supra note 4, § 6.24.
262. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 136 (I1. 1960) (concluding that
failure to hold shareholders meetings to elect directors for ten years was oppressive to 50 percent shareholders);
see also O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 35, § 2.08 (describing how failure to follow corporate meeting
formalities often leads to disputes among shareholders).
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subdivision (b), shall not be considered a factor tending to establish that
the shareholders have personal liability for corporate obligations.!63
The logic behind section 300(e) is not difficult to comprehend. Section 300(b)
validates shareholders agreements respecting the management of a statutory close
corporation in Californiae" against the claim that they are contrary to public
policy because they interfere with the statutory power of the board of directors to
manage the corporation. 20 Ultra-cautious parties might not take advantage of this
provision, however, for fear that the failure to follow management formalities
pursuant to a shareholders agreement could be a factor leading to piercing. To
allay this fear and ensure that the statutory close corporation provision did not
become a trap leading to personal liability, the legislature included section 300(e).
Yet, is it really true that the failure to observe formalities respecting meetings
of directors or shareholders is a factor leading to piercing? This belief is the
critical assumption behind section 300(e) and, in turn, section 17101(b). While
getting beyond the scope of this article, a careful examination of corporate
piercing cases suggests that this may be the legal equivalent of an "old wives'
tale." Admittedly, numerous court opinions266 and writers267 list lack of manage-
ment formalities as a factor for piercing. It is a challenge to find a decision, how-
ever, in which the absence of meeting formalities actually yielded a decision to
pierce, which the observance of such formalities would have changed. Instead,
this "factor" seems at most to be a make-weight used to justify further a result
already reached on other grounds.268 In fact, there is no reason for formalities
regarding meetings to be a factor in piercing. Their presence is hardly likely to
benefit creditors, nor their absence to harm them. (In this regard, it is important
to distinguish informalities regarding meetings from informalities regarding
finances; i.e. failure to issue stock, commingling funds, and typically unfair as
well as poorly documented self-dealing transactions.)
263. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(e) (West 1990).
264. See id. § 300(b) (West 1990); see also id. § 158(a) (West 1990) (defining a close corporation for
purposes of later sections of the statute as a corporation whose articles limit ownership to not more than 35
shareholders and state that the corporation is a close corporation).
265. For a successful example of such a challenge, see Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal.
App. 2d 157,260 P.2d 823 (1953).
266. See, e.g., Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806
(1962).
267. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979, 990 (1971).
268. See Thompson, supra note 259, at 1067-68 (providing a statistical survey of piercing cases which
did not confirm the view that the absence of formalities substantially increases the probability of piercing).
Temple v. Bodega Bay Fisheries, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 2d 279,4 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1960), is illustrative. While the
court mentions the lack of meeting formalities, the real prejudice to the creditor came from inadequately
capitalizing the corporation and then using what funds the company had on improvements to property owned
by the stockholders. Id. at 282-83, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 303-04.
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Accordingly, perhaps the meeting caveat in section 17101(b) was not
necessary at all. If ultra-caution dictated some statement about meetings,
however, it should extend to all meetings, whether or not required by the articles
or operating agreement.
CONCLUSION
A review of LLC statutes generally, and California's in particular, brings to
mind the advice sometimes heard about purchasing an automobile produced in the
first few years after its introduction as a new model. While full of wonderful
improvements over prior models, such a car often has a few bugs not yet worked
out. California's LLC act has benefited from the efforts of earlier LLC acts and
contains a number of improvements. These include, most notably, its prohibition
upon salaries to members without the consent of all, as well as merger provisions
which try valiantly to prevent mergers from becoming a tool to expel members
or to alter the terms of the members' agreement, rather than a means of
combining or selling businesses.
On the other hand, the act has some bugs requiring a recall. It contains
unjustified differences in distribution limits from the rules for a California
corporation. It has an unnecessary and potentially unfortunate caveat regarding
piercing the LLC. Its fiduciary duty provisions raise almost as many questions as
they answer. The act contains a number of glitches in its default rules regarding
fundamental transactions: The provision allowing LLC mergers based upon
majority vote may be contrary to the expectations of most parties entering the sort
of closely held business likely to operate as an LLC; more significantly, it creates
the prospect of majorities using LLC mergers to expel minorities or to circumvent
the unanimity requirements for admission of new members or amendment of the
operating agreement. The act attempts to prevent some of this, but without
complete claiity or coverage. The failure of the act to address the sale of
substantially all of an LLC's assets creates similar problems. The act creates
potential difficulty by allowing members who sold their entire interest to continue
to vote (barring other agreement). Its provision regarding expulsion agreements
is incomplete, as well as poorly thought through in calling for the return of the
expelled member's contribution.
Still, it is important not to change what is right about the act. The legislature
should resist efforts to change the unanimous vote default rule for admission of
new members or the default rule allowing a cash-out at fair market value on six
month's notice.
